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DISTINCTLY CLAIMING AN INVENTION
Karen E. Sandrik*
ABSTRACT
Patent law has a problem. Its foundation rests on the principle that a
patent will clearly define its boundaries through its claims—the metes and
bounds—yet the very standard for defining the boundaries is unclear. In
2014, the Supreme Court sought to guide courts and the patent bar on the
level of precision needed when drafting these claims. Endorsing a “reason-
able certainty” standard, the Court had one goal in Nautilus v. Biosig In-
struments, Inc.: to give definiteness to the law of patent indefiniteness.
Today, instead of a unitary definiteness standard that is applied across all
forums of patent adjudication, there are at least three different standards.
This Article argues that contract law offers a fresh perspective on the
“zone of uncertainty” in patent claims. In both patent law and contract law,
there are inherent limitations to the language that is used to express an
agreement between the two parties in a contract and to the boundaries of an
invention claimed in a patent. This means, in turn, that all contracts are
incomplete and that all patents have some degree of uncertainty. With par-
allel doctrines of indefiniteness, attention to similarities and dissimilarities
in contract law and patent law can foster creative and interesting new ways
of understanding and assessing the current approach taken in patent law
regarding the level of precision demanded of patent claims in both their
pre- and post-issuance state.
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I. INTRODUCTION
PATENT law has a problem. Patents are required to define themetes and bounds of the inventions they claim,1 yet the metes andbounds of the definiteness requirement are entirely uncertain.
In patent law, the patent specification must “conclude with one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”2
This is often called the “definiteness” requirement or indefiniteness doc-
trine. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[T]he nature of language makes
it impossible to capture the essence of a thing.”3 Given the statutory man-
date of drafting claims that distinctly claim the subject matter, combined
with the inherently imperfect system of language, one might expect that
the indefiniteness standard would be clear and unambiguous so that pat-
ent lawyers might reflect a similarly high degree of clarity and
unambiguity when drafting patent claims. Yet for decades the indefinite-
ness doctrine has gone unchecked, leading to a weak standard of claim
definiteness.
In 2014, the Supreme Court stepped into the sea of indefiniteness, re-
placing the predominate definiteness standard—where “[t]he definiteness
of claim terms depends on whether those terms can be given any reasona-
ble meaning,”4—with its own standard: a claim is indefinite if it fails “to
1. “[T]he name of the game is the claim.” This oft-used phrase is attributed to the
late Judge Giles Southerland Rich. See In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (quoting Giles Sutherland Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims—
American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990)).
There is also an argument that patent law should not be looking to the metes and bounds—
the “fence posts”—for the scope of the invention, but rather to the central feature of the
invention. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking
Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1799 (2009) (arguing that “[r]ather
than relying on the illusion of peripheral ‘fence posts,’ patent law may do better to . . . look
to stability of central ‘sign posts’”).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
3. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002).
4. Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(emphasis added).
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inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope
of the invention.”5 While the Court wanted this new standard to steer
clear of the “zone of uncertainty,”6 this new standard has failed to gener-
ate the needed certainty and clarity to the indefiniteness doctrine.
Although the Nautilus Court sought to create a unitary definiteness
standard that is applied across all forums of patent adjudication—the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), federal courts, and
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)—this Article shows that
there are currently at least three different standards. As a result, after
Nautilus, the indefiniteness surrounding indefiniteness has only gotten
more indefinite. Such compounding indefiniteness substantially under-
mines several of the core commitments of the patent system.
One primary goal of the patent system is the public disclosure of
technical knowledge to third parties to aid and support innovation and
technological progress.7 Accordingly, certainty to what is claimed and dis-
closed in a patent application is a critical component to the success of any
patent law system.8 As patent scholars such as John Golden have ex-
plained, “The certainty with which patent scope is defined is a crucial
variable in determining whether the net impact of patents is positive or
negative.”9 There are many of the negative aspects of the so-called bro-
ken patent system:10 for example, high prices of pharmaceuticals11 and
5. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901, 911 (2014) (finding the
previous standards served to “breed lower court confusion, for they lack[ed] the precision
§ 112[(b)] demands”).
6. Id. at 909.
7. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 224 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Com-
plete disclosure as a precondition to the issuance of a patent is part of the quid pro quo
that justifies the limited monopoly for the inventor as consideration for full and immediate
access by the public when the limited time expires.” (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 175 (1824))); see also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (describ-
ing the patent system as one that is “a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the
creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for
an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time”).
8. See Sarah Rajec, Third-Party Interests and the Property Law Misfit in Patent Law,
41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1859, 1900 (explaining “[u]nclear boundaries increase uncertainty for
rights holders and raise information costs for third parties . . . “).
9. John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive Com-
munity”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 323
(2008); see also Greg Reilly, Completing the Picture of Uncertain Patent Scope, 91 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1353, 1353 (2014) (“Uncertain patent scope is perhaps the most significant
problem facing the patent system.”); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT
FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK, 11
(2008) (the authors seek to start answering a question they pose at the beginning of new
section: “Do patents give inventors positive net incentives to invest in innovation?”).
10. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at 2–3 (cataloguing the criticism of the pat-
ent system from industry executives to academics). Bessen and Meurer also explain that
“[b]y the late 1990s, the costs that patents imposed on public firms outweighed the bene-
fits. This provides clear empirical evidence that the patent system is broken.” Id. at 5.
11. See, e.g., Tahir Amin, Patent Abuse is Driving up Drug Prices. Just look at Lantus,
STAT (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/12/07/patent-abuse-rising-drug-
prices-lantus/ [https://perma.cc/9M2P-Q9RJ] (arguing that “[p]atent abuse by drug makers
is one of the most influential drivers of our pricing problem”).
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frequently stalled research and innovation.12 Without certainty of the
metes and bounds of the patent identifying the space that the patent
takes away from others, in terms of research and development (at least
without a license), worldwide collaboration and competition cannot pos-
sibly be at its best.13 Rather than argue, as other scholars have, that the
patent system should simply be abolished,14 this Article shows that a
more definite definiteness standard could go a long way towards fulfilling
the patent system’s commitments to disclosure and innovation.
Although the disclosure function of patent law is imperfect,15 patents
do broadly disseminate nontechnical, helpful knowledge, as well as pro-
vide information to potential investors of the relevant inventions.16 When
this disclosure—both technical and nontechnical—is effective, it follows
that, at least in many instances, the impact of patents is positive.17 Patents
12. See Time to Fix Patents, ECONOMIST: LEADERS (Aug. 8, 2015), https://
www.economist.com/leaders/2015/08/08/time-to-fix-patents [https://perma.cc/M3KR-
7YQT].
13. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“It is a
‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which
the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari
Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004))).
14. See generally MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MO-
NOPOLY (2008) (arguing it is time to consider abolishing the patent system, as the authors
find no evidence that patents actually serve to increase innovation).
15. Patent scholars have highlighted that patent disclosure is imperfect both in its effi-
cacy of providing notice and imparting useful information to scientists and innovators. See,
e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Contextualizing Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1849
(2016) (finding patents are not performing the disclosure function well because “[t]he aver-
age patent is written in legalese, uses vague language, and is hard to connect to commercial
activity”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 560–62 (2009) (argu-
ing the patent document itself is not an effective means of disclosure); Timothy R. Hol-
brook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 139–46 (2006) (making the case
that patent law does an inadequate job of teaching the technical information to skilled
artisans); Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21–25 (arguing
scientists and innovators largely ignore patents); Sean B. Seymore, Uninformative Patents,
55 HOUS. L. REV. 377, 378 (2017) (arguing the “minimal disclosure threshold can produce
patents that are uninformative from a technical standpoint, meaning that they provide little
meaningful information to truly fulfill patent law’s disclosure function”). But see, e.g., Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
545, 585 (2012) (conducting an empirical study in the nanotechnology industry and finding
that “patents can be useful as sources of technical information”); Jason Rantanen, Periph-
eral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 39–41 (2012) (defending patent law’s disclosure
system by arguing that “peripheral disclosure” enables patents to disseminate information
in areas outside of the patent document itself).
16. See J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1574
(2016) (finding that “[p]atent law may fail to inform skilled artisans of the patented inven-
tion’s technical details to the degree we would desire, yet still provide valuable nontechni-
cal information to people who are in a position to invest in the invention”); see also Clark
D. Asay, The Informational Value of Patents, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259, 265 (2016)
(arguing patent disclosure has value in the form of information signaling); Sean B.
Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 623–24 (2010)
(explaining patents “signal[ ] research and development (R&D) strength to customers and
competitors . . . inducing inventive activity,” as well as the patent document itself “serv[ing]
as a form of technical literature”).
17. Bessen & Meurer explain that if there is better patent notice, by way of higher
quality patent disclosure, for example, than this “[b]etter patent notice makes technology
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play a critical role in innovation,18 and patent portfolios are viewed as
one of the most important assets of corporate entities and research orga-
nizations. This is particularly true for the pharmaceutical industry, an in-
dustry that is largely dependent on global patent protection to support
knowledge, product development, and collaboration in medical re-
search.19 Without patents, innovation in the pharmaceutical industry
would be eliminated or at least more than halved.20
Moreover, “British economists, [C.T. Taylor and Z.A. Silberston,] esti-
mated that pharmaceutical R&D expenditures would be reduced by 64
percent.”21 Edmund Kitch has also found that “a patent system lowers
the cost for the owner of technological information of contracting with
other firms possessing complementary information and resources.”22 In a
time where global collaboration and knowledge development are needed,
the scope of patent law must be clear for third parties—the public—to
learn and use the information imparted by the four corners of the patent.
Patent scholars, such as Jason Rantanen and Robin Feldman, have ar-
gued that the pre-Nautilus standard was insufficient and that the post-
Nautilus standard is still failing to bring the rigor needed to the indefinite-
ness doctrine.23 What this Article offers to the scholarly debate is the idea
that there is another body of law that can inform this debate that has not
yet been explored: contract law. In both patent law and contract law,
there are inherent limitations to the language that is used to express an
agreement between the two parties in a contract and the boundaries of an
invention claimed in a patent. This means, in turn, that all contracts are
incomplete and that all patents have “[s]ome modicum of uncertainty.”24
Contract law offers a fresh perspective on the “zone of uncertainty” in
patent claims. In contract law, an agreement can have a high degree of
markets more efficient, and hence more attractive to small inventors”). BESSEN &
MEURER, supra note 9, at 21.
18. This positive role in innovation is hampered, however, when there is uncertain
patent scope. Michael Burstein has argued that the “[w]hen patents are of uncertain valid-
ity or scope, their mere presence creates risk and uncertainty that deters productive invest-
ments.” Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 498, 503 (2015). To help combat this uncertainty and risk, he argues parties seeking to
“quiet title” should have increased standing. See id.
19. See Jonathan DM Atkinson & Rachel Jones, Intellectual Property and Its Role in
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1 FUTURE MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 1547, 1547 (2009) (“Strong
IP systems can incite funding into knowledge development and, thus, promote innovation.
This is particularly relevant for the pharmaceutical industry, which depends on patent pro-
tection to support its investments into medical research.”).
20. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3, at 1–3, 9–11, 11 n.48, 17–20 (2003).
21. Henry G. Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceuti-
cal and Biotechnology Industries, in SCIENCE AND CENTS: EXPLORING THE ECONOMICS OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY 87, 88 (John V. Duca & Mine K. Yücel eds., 2003).
22. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 277 (1977).
23. See Section III.B and accompanying notes; see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note
9, at 26 (making the policy suggestion to “[m]ake claims clear and unambiguous by enforc-
ing strong limits against vague or overly abstract claims”).
24. Nautilus v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 909 (2014).
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uncertainty because the uncertainty only impacts two people—the two
people that permitted that level of uncertainty in the first instance. Yet, in
patent law, the patent claims need to have a low degree of uncertainty.
This is because the uncertainty regarding a patent’s boundaries impacts
the public at large (for example, in the form of prices on pharmaceutical
products) as well as those skilled in the relevant art (for example, in the
form of a decision whether to research a particular new drug pathway).
Attention to these parallels and divides in contract law and patent law
can enable courts and the patent bar to tailor their approaches to patent
claiming in the face of multiple standards that all seek to establish the
appropriate threshold of indefiniteness. Further, contract law, and com-
mercial law more generally, has much to offer toward tailoring the level
of threshold of certainty to a particular context. In secured transactions
law, unlike in contract law, the level of uncertainty must be low for se-
cured financing to function properly. And in patent law, there might need
to be a different threshold applied at the patent examination stage (to
pre-issuance claims) than at the post-grant stage (to post-issuance
claims).
Aiming to increase certainty in the doctrine of claim definiteness to
help ensure patents are a net positive on worldwide innovation, this Arti-
cle demonstrates two points. First, that there is more indefiniteness of
indefiniteness since Nautilus. Second, that contract law decisions and doc-
trines can provide guidance and a new perspective to the USPTO, federal
judges, and policymakers in determining the level of precision needed in
patent claims. In particular, contract law’s long history and practice of
handling language that is vague, indefinite, or ambiguous can offer in-
struction on how patent law’s indefiniteness standard should be shaped.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II is a brief primer on the indefi-
niteness doctrine. It identifies the roots and policy of the doctrine. Part
III looks at pre-Nautilus law that shows why the Supreme Court decided,
at least in part, to hear Nautilus. Part IV focuses on the Nautilus opinion.
Part V explains the post-Nautilus state of the indefiniteness doctrine, con-
tending that Nautilus only brought more uncertainty to the law of indefi-
niteness. Part VI then briefly looks at the indefiniteness and ambiguity
doctrines in contract law. This Part demonstrates how patent law can look
to some of this law to help better understand options moving forward
that may foster more certainty in the law of patent indefiniteness.
II. PRIMER: THE DEFINITENESS REQUIREMENT
In the Patent Act of 1790, patent applicants were required to write a
“description . . . of the thing or things . . . invented or discovered.”25 This
description might include the prior art that the invention or new discov-
ery was building upon or had learned from, as well as the new invention
or discovery being claimed by the patent applicant. This combined ap-
25. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (repealed 1793).
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proach—describing the old with the new—made it difficult to “distinctly
ascertain for which, in particular, the patent is claimed.”26 The Patent Act
of 1836 changed this combination, serving as the foundation of our cur-
rent law.27 The patent was separated into two sections: the specification
and the claims. This was done to help ensure that the patent had better
defined boundaries, with the claims section requiring that claims must
“particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ] the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention or discovery.”28
Today, much like the Patent Act of 1836 required, the patent specifica-
tion must fully, clearly, and concisely describe the claimed invention.29
The audience for this written description requirement is a person having
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) to which the patent application per-
tains, or simply, a skilled artisan.30 After reading the patent specification,
the PHOSITA should know how to make the invention, use the inven-
tion, or both.31 This part of the specification is written in relatively plain
English and has multiple parts, making it easy to identify the field of the
invention; to identify the background of the invention; and to read both a
concise summary of the invention and a fuller, more detailed description
of the invention. While there will be technical language in this disclosure,
many readers, even those with no technical training in any sort of science
or engineering, can fumble their way through the first portion of most
26. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1020 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
27. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (current version at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 1–390 (2012)).
28. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(a) (2019).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, . . .
to make and use the same . . . .”). Part (f) of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is unique to claims drafted in a
means-plus-function format. There, a claim element “may be expressed as a means or step
for performing a specified function,” which then limits the claim to the “corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 35
U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012). This Article does not discuss means-plus-function claims. Impor-
tantly, however, means-plus-function claims have their own indefiniteness standard. In
short, “a means-plus-function clause is indefinite if a person of ordinary skill in the art
would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the
corresponding function in the claim.” Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1312
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d
1236, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); see also John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How
Courts Adjudicate Patent Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 614-615 (2016)
(finding that “patent claims drafted in means-plus-function format were more likely than
those drafted in other formats to be held indefinite”).
30. There are several ways that patent practitioners, scholars, and judges abbreviate
the statutory phrases “person having ordinary skill in the art,” 35 U.S.C. § 103, and “per-
son skilled in the art,” 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). Two other common variations include
“POSITA” and “POSA.” For clarity, I will use “PHOSITA” or “skilled artisan.”
31. Scholars have recently brought attention to problems with this statement that the
PHOSITA should know how to make and/or use the invention. For example, Janet Freilich
has identified that there is a replicability crisis in patent law: “[T]hat perhaps up to 90% of
[patent] experiments [disclosed in patents] do not work.” Janet Freilich, The Replicability
Crisis in Patent Law, 95 IND. L. J. 431, 434 (2020). As a result, “if most inventions in
patents do not work and are not replicable,” then it follows that the goals of patent law,
namely, for third parties to get access to and learn from other’s disclosed inventions, will
not be met. Id. at 435.
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patent specifications with at least some understanding of what the inven-
tion concerns. This is likely not the case, however, when reading the last
part of the patent specification.
Beyond adequately describing the claimed invention, the patent speci-
fication must “conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint
inventor regards as the invention.”32 This is often called the “definite-
ness” requirement, the focus of this Article. The part about “claiming the
subject matter”33 refers to the patent claims, the last part of the patent
that is written in a different style than the first part of the specification.
Claims are the heart of the patent, “the portion of the patent document
that defines the patentee’s rights.”34 Claims are like the fence on a piece
of property, showing distinctly where the metes and bounds are according
to a real property deed. The claims of a patent are not meant to add to
the prior description of the patent in the specification, and they are cer-
tainly not meant to add any square footage to the description of the pat-
ent. Rather, claims function to define the scope of the patent very
precisely and to support the disclosure made earlier in the specification.
Let’s look at a classic teaching example: the coffee cup holder. The first
two sentences of the summary of the invention from a patent covering a
cup holder might say: “This invention provides recyclable, corrugated
containers and container holders which can be made from existing cel-
lulosic materials, such as paper. The preferred recyclable, corrugated hot
beverage container includes a lip and an internal cavity for containing a
hot or cold medium.”35 Compare that language to the first claim of the
cup holder:
What is claimed is:
A recyclable, insulating beverage container holder, comprising a
corrugated tubular member comprising cellulosic material and at
least a first opening therein for receiving and retaining a beverage
container, said corrugated tubular member comprising fluting means
for containing insulating air; said fluting means comprising fluting
adhesively attached to a liner with a recyclable adhesive.36
The subject matter of both excerpts is clearly the same invention, yet the
style of writing is completely different. The problem is that it is hard to be
clear when writing the boundaries of something—a right to exclude
others—that is, by its definition, intangible. It is easy to touch, feel, and
describe a tangible fence. It is not easy to adequately describe the patent
so that a PHOSITA is able to make and use the invention and so that the
invention’s precise boundaries are known. The difficulty of drafting
claims was noted by an early Supreme Court opinion: “The specification
32. § 112(b) (emphasis added).
33. Id.
34. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
35. U.S. Patent No. 5,205,473 col. 1 l. 44 (filed Mar. 19, 1992).
36. Id. at col. 4 l. 62.
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and claims of a patent, particularly if the invention be at all complicated,
constitute one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with
accuracy.”37
Yet, it is clear that if a patent claim fails the test of indefiniteness at the
examination level (at the USPTO), the patent claim is unpatentable in
the first instance, or if the patent is already granted, the patent claim will
be invalidated. But what does it mean to “distinctly claim[ ] the subject
matter?”38 Indeed, “[m]ost patent claims have some amount of ambiguity
in their scope.”39 Language is imprecise and its use varies from person to
person. As a result, the question we should be asking is “how much [am-
biguity or indefiniteness] is too much?”40 In other words, recognizing that
there will be some level of imprecision in claims, How much imprecision
in claiming does patent law tolerate before it is too much imprecision,
leading to a result of rejection by the USPTO or invalidity by a federal
court?
Much of this level-of-precision question can be answered by looking to
the policy behind the definiteness requirement and to the central role
that claims play for the scope of the patent. There are two main policy
considerations here, and both deal with third parties. As with other areas
of law, such as commercial law, anytime third parties are involved the
level of certainty needs to be increased.
The first policy consideration here is that the claims need to teach a
PHOSITA to “construct and use [the invention] after the expiration of
the patent.”41 The second policy consideration is that claims should “in-
form the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly
asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used or
manufactured without a license and which may not.”42
Most basically, if patentees fail to post clear warning signs of what is,
and what is not, their property where they want to exclude others from
trespassing, the public will not know if they are trespassing or not.43 This
policy reaches back to the beginning of the definiteness requirement in
the U.S.
In 1822, the Supreme Court explained that the disclosure statute had
two purposes: (1) “to make known the manner of constructing the [inven-
tion] . . . so as to enable arti[s]ans to make and use it,”44 and (2) “to put
37. Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892).
38. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(a) (2019).
39. Dennis Crouch, Supreme Court: To Be Valid, Patent Claims Must Provide Reason-
able Certainty Regarding the Claim Scope, PATENTLY-O (June 2, 2014), https://patent-
lyo.com/patent/2014/06/reasonable-certainty-regarding.html [https://perma.cc/YZ46-JJ7U].
40. Id. (emphasis omitted).
41. Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931).
42. Id.
43. See Karen E. Sandrik, Reframing Patent Remedies, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 95, 99
(2012) (arguing that patent law should look to the law of trespass in handling strategic
holdout behavior impacting patent remedies); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at
8 (titling a subsection with the apt statement: “The Notice Function: If You Can’t Tell the
Boundaries, It Ain’t Property”).
44. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433 (1822).
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the public in possession of what the party claims as his own invention.”45
As to the second purpose, the Court further explained the importance of
preventing the inventor from “pretending that his invention is more than
what it really is, or different from its ostensible objects.”46
This “pretending” concern still exists today. The thought is that if pat-
entees are permitted to “be vague, they will have an incentive to do so,
since vague claims will increase the de facto scope of a patent by forcing
competitors to expand the ‘safe distance’ they keep from the patentee’s
turf (claims).”47 A similar tactic exists, and is sometimes even en-
couraged, in the intentional drafting of open, vague, or ambiguous con-
tracts.48 This is another reason why contract law is helpful in providing
guidance for the level of precision of language that patent law should
demand of its patent applicants when submitting claims.
Because claims, at least in theory, provide this notice to PHOSITAs
and the public—informing both what the patent covers and how it is dif-
ferent than what came before it (the prior art)—claims are also central to
determining the scope of the patent, which impacts validity. Therefore,
emphasis has been placed (rightfully) on the construction of claims. In-
deed, the “stakes in trying to improve the predictability of claim construc-
tion are large.”49 Much scholarship has been devoted to improving the
legal process of construing these claims.50 Yet, before we determine how
to best construe claims, we need to address how clear the claims need to
be written in the first instance.
45. Id. at 434.
46. Id.
47. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POL-
ICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 303 (7th ed. 2017) (explaining that the requirement of definite
claims “seeks to guard against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages
to others arising from uncertainty as to their rights” (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Ap-
pliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938))).
48. There is a rich academic literature in contract law regarding whether there are
economic benefits of permitting, even encouraging, parties to intentionally draft incom-
plete and vague contracts. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and
the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 569, 572 (2003) (arguing the goal of con-
tract law should not be getting to the “correct” answer, but rather to teach parties to write
contracts in “the court’s language,” thereby permitting the four-corners rule to reduce
transaction costs); B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Incomplete Contracts
and Strategic Ambiguity, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 902, 903 (1998) (arguing that “if contracts
must be somewhat incomplete (due to transaction costs or limits on verifiability) then it is
often optimal for parties to write contracts that are even more incomplete”); Gillian K.
Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 159, 159 (1994) (“In recent years writers in both economics and law have recognized
the prevalence and importance of incomplete contracting in the design of markets and
organizations.”).
49. Golden, supra note 9, at 322.
50. Currently, claims are construed from the perspective of the PHOSITA, although
John Golden has persuasively argued that it would improve the predictability of claim con-
struction if claims were construed through the lens of claim drafters. Id. at 380. Other
scholars have different ideas on how to improve claim construction. See Burk & Lemley,
supra note 1, at 1747 (arguing that patent law should look to central claiming, instead of
peripheral claiming, during claim construction).
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III. PRE-2014 INDEFINITENESS STANDARD
This Part will start with a discussion of how precise the USPTO wants
claims to be written, at least when initially evaluating claims in a patent
application. Next, this Part will discuss the predominant standard for is-
sued patents that were challenged for indefiniteness in federal court prior
to the 2014 Nautilus opinion, thereby setting up the discussion of why the
Nautilus Court felt that it needed to take yet another patent opinion.51
A. EX PARTE MIYAZAKI: A STRICTER STANDARD
When patent applicants make their way through the examination pro-
cess at the USPTO, the applicants need to ensure that their respective
claims in their applications meet the definiteness requirement. At the ex-
amination stage, patent applicants have the ability to amend their claims
if the examiner finds any fault with them. Yet, once a patent is granted,
the patent enjoys a presumption of validity. Because of the applicants’
ability to amend claims, and the patent’s presumption of validity once it is
granted, the USPTO employs a stricter indefiniteness standard for claims
in the examination process than for granted claims that are being chal-
lenged in post-issuance patent litigation.
This stricter standard came about in 2008 when the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) released a rare precedential opinion,
Ex parte Miyazaki.52 The BPAI adopted a new standard of indefiniteness
for patent applicants that effectively lowered the threshold of ambiguity,
thus requiring patent applicants to define claims with greater specificity.53
This opinion was issued a couple months after John Love, the USPTO’s
then-Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, called for a
stricter standard of indefiniteness to help increase the quality of patents.
Love had urged examiners that they could reject claim language that had
“more than one reasonable interpretation.”54 Perhaps in response to this
call for a stricter standard, the BPAI explained in Miyazaki:
[W]e employ a lower threshold of ambiguity when reviewing a pend-
ing claim for indefiniteness than those used by post-issuance review-
ing courts. In particular, rather than requiring that the claims are
insolubly ambiguous, we hold that if a claim is amenable to two or
more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requir-
51. As many patent commentators have noted for ten or so years now, the Supreme
Court continues to grant certiorari in an unprecedented number of patent cases. For rea-
sons why this may be the case, see, for example, Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the
Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 2d 27, 27–28 (2014) (arguing the Supreme Court is sending
a strong “message about restraint, about carefully constructed logic, and about coming into
the fold of judicial decision-making” to the Federal Circuit).
52. No. 2007-3300, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1207 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 19, 2008) (precedential).
53. Id. at 1211 (holding the use of the phrase “sheet feeding area” was amenable to
two or more plausible claim constructions, and, therefore, the claims are indefinite).
54. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Memorandum from John Love on Indefiniteness Re-
jections Under 35 U.S.C. 112, Second Paragraph at 2 (Sept. 2, 2008), https://
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/preognotice/sec-
tion_112_2nd_09_02_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZX9A-2JUF].
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ing the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of
the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35
U.S.C. § 112[(b)], as indefinite.55
This is a strict standard of claim indefiniteness—a low threshold as it is
triggered easily—because it requires that the patent applicant draft
claims that can only be interpreted one way. To put this difficult task in
context, even the most simple contracts can often succumb to multiple
constructions of particular key language. In the infamous Frigilament Im-
porting Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp.56 opinion, multiple experts
were needed to opine on what the parties meant when they used the word
“chicken.”57
At the time of Miyazaki, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP) informed the examiner assigned to the patent application that
“the claims must particularly point out and distinctly define the metes
and bounds of the subject matter that will be protected by the patent
grant.”58 If the examiner concludes that the patent claim does not meet
this standard, then, under the MPEP, the examiner should issue a rejec-
tion “and an analysis as to why the phrase(s) used in the claim is ‘vague
and indefinite.’”59
Further, when evaluating claims, the USPTO and its examiners use the
“broadest reasonable interpretation” standard for pre-issuance patents.
This means that “[d]uring patent examination, the pending claims must
be ‘given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the
specification.’”60 Prior to Miyazaki, which makes a claim indefinite for
having two plausible constructions, a claim was indefinite only if it was
not “amenable to construction.”61
55. Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1211 (emphasis added).
56. 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
57. Id. at 119–20.
58. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE,
U.S. DEP’T OF COM. § 2171 (8th ed. rev. 6, Sept. 2007), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/mpep/old/E8R7_2100.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JKS-CA5S] [hereinafter MPEP] “An ap-
plication fails to comply with the [definiteness] requirement . . . when the claims do not set
out and define the invention with a reasonable degree of precision and particularity. In this
regard, the definiteness of the language must be analyzed, not in a vacuum, but always in
light of the teachings of the disclosure as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in
the art.” Id § 2106.
59. Id. § 2173.02.
60. Id. § 2111 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc)); see also Ex parte Breed, No. 2012-003990, 2014 WL 2536964, at *3 (P.T.A.B.
June 4, 2014) (“During examination of a patent application, pending claims are given their
broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification.” (citing In re Am. Acad.
of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004))). This standard is different when
evaluating post-grant claims in America Invents Act (AIA) trial proceedings. See PTAB
Issues Claim Construction Final Rule: Final Rule Changing Claim Construction Standard
for Interpreting Claims in AIA Trial Proceedings, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct. 9,
2018, 9:34 AM), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-ap-
peal-board/procedures/ptab-issues-claim-construction# [https://perma.cc/LT63-38SB].
61. See, e.g., Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2001). Patent commentators noted that this previous standard was too relaxed, creat-
ing uncertainty of the boundaries of patents. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Indeterminism and the
Property-Patent Equation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 100 (2009) (“Before [Miyazaki],
2020] Distinctly Claiming an Invention 553
The words—“amenable to construction” and “insolubly ambiguous”—
mentioned by the BPAI in the block quote above are discussed in the
next section. This was the standard the Federal Circuit employed prior to
Miyazaki (and continued using until Nautilus) for post-issuance patents.
B. THE “INSOLUBLY AMBIGUOUS” STANDARD:
THE LESS STRICT STANDARD
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 2014 Nautilus opinion, the Federal Circuit
interpreted the relatively sparse statutory language of “distinctly” by cre-
ating what is often termed the “insolubly ambiguous” standard. Recog-
nizing that some level of impreciseness in claim drafting is inevitable, the
Federal Circuit explained that the inventor does not have to meet such a
high threshold as ensuring “that claims be plain on their face in order to
avoid condemnation for indefiniteness.”62 Instead, the Federal Circuit
“asked . . . that the claims be amenable to construction.”63 And by con-
struction, the Federal Circuit was referring to claim construction in patent
litigation.64
Claim construction is an important step in patent litigation, as the defi-
nition of these claims draws the boundary lines of the patent holder’s
right to exclude.65 After the claims are construed, the parties often decide
to settle because the parties now understand whether the allegedly in-
fringing technology is within the boundaries of the patent’s scope.
If a claim is amenable to construction, it does not necessarily mean that
there is just one way to construe the claim. Indeed, a patent claim might
be construed two or more ways, but so long as the at-issue terms “can be
given any reasonable meaning,” the patent application has passed the
first step of meeting the definiteness requirement.66
Further, the Federal Circuit concluded that a claim was indefinite only
if the “claim is insolubly ambiguous, and no narrowing construction can
properly be adopted.”67 Put in slightly different words: “Only when a
claims subject to multiple plausible constructions—shown above to be a major contributor
to the indeterminacy of patent rights—were not indefinite. This legal principle facilitated a
situation in which potential infringers lack effective means to assess whether they are in
fact infringing and, moreover, whether the relevant claims are anticipated under the prior
art.”).
62. Exxon Research, 265 F.3d at 1375. Indeed, this is something many seemingly sim-
ple contracts fail to avoid, as the four-corner rule is often rejected in favor of permitting
parol evidence to explain or supplement the agreement.
63. Id.
64. Claim construction is the process where a district court, in a special hearing, inter-
prets the meaning and scope of the patent claims. Peter S. Menell et al., Claim Construc-
tion: A Structured Framework, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 29, 2009), https://patentlyo.com/patent/
2009/09/claim-construction-a-structured-framework-1.html [https://perma.cc/3HYC-
QSAK] (explaining the Federal Circuit’s holding in Phillips and setting out a method for
claim construction analysis).
65. See id.
66. Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
67. Exxon Research, 265 F.3d at 1375; see also Datamize, LLC, 417 F.3d at 1347 (“The
definiteness requirement, however, does not compel absolute clarity. Only claims ‘not
amenable to construction’ or ‘insolubly ambiguous’ are indefinite.”); Bancorp Servs.,
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claim remains insolubly ambiguous without a discernible meaning after
all reasonable attempts at construction must a court declare it indefi-
nite.”68 Accordingly, if the term at issue in the claim can be construed—
that is, it is amenable to construction (even if both the specification and
the perspective of the PHOSITA are needed)—then the claim is not in-
solubly ambiguous, and therefore, it is not indefinite.
This standard has been widely criticized, both before and after Nauti-
lus, for being too low of a bar. Indeed, Robin Feldman has noted that
“[t]he Federal Circuit’s rule had ensured that very few patents could ever
be overturned for indefiniteness.”69 Moreover, Jason Rantanen, citing
many exemplary cases and quantitative empirical evidence from data pro-
vided by John Allison and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, explained that “it is
difficult to view [the Federal Circuit’s insolubly ambiguous standard] as
anything other than a mere threshold.”70 Looking at Federal Circuit opin-
ions from ten years before the 2014 Nautilus opinion, Rantanen “calcu-
lated the rate at which the Federal Circuit found challenged claims
indefinite . . . to be 29%.”71 Truly, it is as if the Federal Circuit “was
sending a clear signal: don’t bring definiteness challenges except in the
most extreme of cases.”72 Reflecting this standard, in their own original
empirical study from final validity decisions from early 1989 through
1996, from both district courts and the Federal Circuit, John Allison and
Mark Lemley found that only 5.8% of invalidations are based on claim
indefiniteness.73
So while historically the definiteness requirement was certainly meant
as “more than a linguistic quibble,”74 it had become little more than that
L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins., 359 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding when a claim “is
not insolubly ambiguous, it is not invalid for indefiniteness”); Christa J. Laser, A Definite
Claim on Claim Indefiniteness: An Empirical Study of Definiteness Cases of the Past Dec-
ade with a Focus on the Federal Circuit and the Insolubly Ambiguous Standard, 10 CHI.-
KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 25 (2010) (finding that of the forty-eight indefiniteness cases be-
tween the years 1998 and 2008, the Federal Circuit invalidated one-third of the cases).
68. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (“The requirement to ‘distinctly’ claim means that the claim must have a mean-
ing discernible to one of ordinary skill in the art when construed according to correct
principles.”).
69. Feldman, supra note 51, at 34.
70. Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, 18 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 430, 434 (2015).
71. Id. at 435. Rantanen also thoroughly explores John Allison and Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette’s own findings of indefiniteness, which covered a broader time period. There,
Allison and Ouellette’s data shows a 26% indefiniteness rate. Id. Conducting her own
study of claim indefiniteness from 1998–2008, Christa Laser calculated a 45% rate of the
Federal Circuit holding claims indefinite. See Laser, supra note 67, at 32.
72. Id. at 436.
73. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Liti-
gated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208 (1998).
74. Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981) (“The definite-
ness requirement is more than a linguistic quibble, however. Its purpose is to demarcate
the boundaries of the purported invention, in order to provide notice to others of the limits
‘beyond which experimentation and invention are undertaken at the risk of infringe-
ment.’” (quoting Norton Co. v. Bendix Corp., 449 F.2d 553, 555 (2d Cir. 1971))).
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by 2014. Accordingly, the grant of certiorari in Nautilus was not a
surprise.
IV. THE “REASONABLE CERTAINTY” STANDARD
In 2014, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Su-
preme Court overturned the Federal Circuit’s “amenable to construc-
tion” and “insolubly ambiguous” standard in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc.75 The Court explained that the Federal Circuit’s stan-
dard failed to provide sufficient guidance for district courts and the pat-
ent bar, and the expressions were not, in themselves, precise enough.76
Simply, “such terminology . . . [left] courts and the patent bar at sea with-
out a reliable compass.”77 Moreover, the Federal Circuit standard was
“breed[ing] lower court confusion.”78
As a result, and with the aim of providing better guidance to courts and
the patent bar, the Nautilus Court held that “a patent is invalid for indefi-
niteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the pat-
ent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty,
those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.”79 This new stan-
dard is often referred to as the Nautilus standard or the “reasonable cer-
tainty” standard, as opposed to the previous amenable to construction or
insolubly ambiguous standard.80
A. “SPACED RELATIONSHIP”
The technology in Nautilus provides a good opportunity to delve
deeper into the indefiniteness requirement. It is relatable technology and
not too technical. The patent in Nautilus covers a heart-rate monitor that
is designed for use during exercise.81
The particular claims at issue in the opinion were directed to “a heart-
rate monitor contained in a hollow cylindrical bar” that is grasped by a
user during exercise (e.g., on a treadmill or stationary bike).82 When
grasped, the “user contact[s] two electrodes, one ‘live’ and one ‘com-
mon.’”83 The different polarities filter out electromyogram signals gener-
ated by the exerciser’s skeletal muscles, the signals that often mask the
heartbeat.84 The particular housing mechanism of these electrodes fur-
ther helps to “eliminate the effects of muscle artifact which is brought
about when a user, in exercising, moves his arms or squeezes the monitor
75. 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014).
76. See id. at 911–12.
77. Id. at 912. The Court did note, however, that the test applied by the Federal Circuit
“may come closer to tracking the statutory prescription” than the words suggest. See id. at
911.
78. Id. at 911.
79. Id. at 901.
80. See discussion supra Parts III, IV; discussion infra Part V.
81. U.S. Patent No. 5,337,753 (filed June 9, 1992).
82. Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 903–04.
83. Id. at 904.
84. Id. at 903.
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with his fingers.”85 As a result, the invention covered in this patent “pro-
vide[s] improved heart rate monitors for use in association with exercis-
ing apparatus and/or exercising procedures.”86
Central to the litigation was Claim 1. It contained a limitation describ-
ing the electrodes as being “mounted . . . in spaced relationship with each
other.”87 This “spaced relationship” language was the subject of Nautilus’
claim that Biosig’s patent did not meet the definiteness requirement88:
“According to Biosig, [the] ‘spaced relationship’ referred to the distance
between the live electrode and the common electrode in each electrode
pair.”89 Yet, Nautilus argued that the “‘spaced relationship’ must be a
distance ‘greater than the width of each electrode,’”90 or else the claims
would be open to multiple interpretations that would reflect very differ-
ent understandings of the scope of the patent.
During claim construction, the district court defined the term “spaced
relationship” to mean that “‘there is a defined relationship between the
live electrode and the common electrode on one side of the cylindrical
bar and the same or a different defined relationship between the live
electrode and the common electrode on the other side of the cylindrical
bar.’”91 The district court did not make any reference to the width of the
electrodes, yet Biosig’s submissions to the USPTO during a reexamina-
tion of the patent seemed to state that there needed to be equal distance
between the electrodes, stating that “the [Biosig] patent sufficiently in-
formed a person skilled in the art how to configure the detecting elec-
trodes so as ‘to produce equal EMG [signals] from the left and right
hands.’”92
As a result, the spaced relationship needed to be at least greater than
the width of each electrode. The district court sided with Nautilus, finding
the “spaced relationship” term “‘did not tell [the court] or anyone what
precisely the space should be,’ or even supply ‘any parameters’ for deter-
mining the appropriate spacing.”93
The Federal Circuit reversed under its standard that “[a] claim is indef-
inite . . . ‘only when it is “not amenable to construction” or “insolubly
ambiguous.”94 The Federal Circuit conducted its analysis by looking to
the intrinsic evidence—evidence contained inside the patent itself—and
the process of obtaining that patent, including the claim language, specifi-
cation, and prosecution history.95 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit con-
85. ‘753 Patent col. 1 l. 20.
86. Id. col. 1 l. 28.
87. Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 904 (emphasis added).




92. Id. at 905.
93. Id. at 906.
94. Id. (quoting the Federal Circuit’s opinion, 715 F.3d 891, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quot-
ing Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005))).
95. Id.
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cluded “that a skilled artisan would know that she could attain the
indicated functions of equalizing and removing the EMG signals by ad-
justing design variables, including spacing.”96
B. NAUTILUS, INC. V. BIOSIG INSTRUMENTS, INC.
The Supreme Court agreed with several parts of the Federal Circuit’s
analysis. First, the Court agreed that definiteness is properly evaluated
from the perspective of the PHOSITA.97 Second, the Court agreed that
patent claims are properly read in light of the intrinsic evidence that a
patent offers: the insights into the claim language offered by the specifica-
tion and prosecution history.98 And third, the Court agreed that definite-
ness is properly measured at the time of the patent filing—and what a
PHOSITA would understand at that moment.99
The Court then noted that the parties disagreed with respect to how
much imprecision patent law permits. Biosig, along with the Solicitor
General, argued that a patent should only need to provide “reasonable
notice of the scope of the claimed invention,”100 while Nautilus argued
that a patent should be “invalid when a claim is ‘ambiguous, such that
readers could reasonably interpret the claim’s scope differently.’”101
Agreeing with Nautilus—although on remand, the Federal Circuit af-
firmed its finding that the term “spaced relationship” was not indefi-
nite102—the Supreme Court expressed that it was aware there was a
“‘delicate balance’”103 and that there are inherent limitations of the lan-
guage that is used to express the claimed invention. This means that there
will necessarily be “[s]ome modicum of uncertainty.”104 Yet, at the same
time, there should not be so much question as to what the invention is
that there is “‘[a] zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimenta-
tion may enter only at the risk of infringement claims.’”105 This is why the
Court concluded:
Cognizant of the competing concerns, we read § 112[(b)] to require
that a patent’s claims, viewed in the light of the specification and
prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of
the invention with reasonable certainty. The definiteness require-
ment, so understood, mandates clarity, while recognizing that abso-
96. Id. at 907.





102. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
103. Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 909 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 909–10 (citing United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236
(1942)).
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lute precision is unattainable.106
V. POST-2014 INDEFINITENESS STANDARD
It has now been over five years since Nautilus, which begs the question:
Did the Nautilus reasonable certainty test bring any more grit or any
teeth to the indefiniteness standard? Moreover, do the courts and the
patent bar have the guidance that Justice Ginsburg and the Court sought
to provide when overhauling the Federal Circuit’s insolubly ambiguous
standard?
The answers, as the following sections will illustrate, are no and no: No,
the standard does not seem to have changed despite the Nautilus opinion.
And no, there is no more guidance in this area of law and no more cer-
tainty. Indeed, there is more uncertainty in the doctrine of indefiniteness
now than prior to Nautilus.
A. GRANTED PATENTS IN FEDERAL LITIGATION
On remand, the Federal Circuit came to the same conclusion regarding
“spaced relationship” under the reasonable certainty standard as it had
under the insolubly ambiguous standard—that the term “spaced relation-
ship” is not indefinite.107 Beyond the affirmation of its prior holding, the
Federal Circuit opinion also provides a first look at the application of the
new definiteness standard.
The parties, Nautilus and Biosig, differed on whether the new reasona-
ble certainty standard was “a new, stricter standard or whether, in re-
jecting the phrases ‘insolubly ambiguous’ and ‘amenable to construction,’
the Court was primarily clarifying that a patent’s claims must inform
those skilled in the art with ‘reasonable certainty’ of what is claimed.”108
While the Federal Circuit declined to directly answer the parties’ ques-
tion, it did provide a glimpse into its feelings on the new standard, echo-
ing a metaphor, seemingly with a bit of sarcasm, that the Supreme Court
used at the conclusion of its opinion. Playing off of the Court’s nautical
metaphor of a “reliable compass,” the Federal Circuit responded: “[t]he
Court has . . . modified the standard by which lower courts examine alleg-
edly ambiguous claims; we may now steer by the bright star of ‘reasona-
ble certainty,’ rather than the unreliable compass of ‘insoluble
ambiguity.’”109
The Federal Circuit followed with the statement that “[r]easonableness
106. Id. at 910 (“[T]he certainty which the law requires in patents is not greater than is
reasonable, having regard to their subject matter.” (quoting Minerals Separation, Ltd. v.
Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916))).
107. Biosig, 783 F.3d at 1376 (“On remand, we maintain our reversal of the district
court’s determination that Biosig’s patent claims are indefinite.”).
108. Id. at 1379. This very question has been a point of discussion among patent schol-
ars and the patent community. See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, Biosig v. Nautilus: Indefiniteness
on Remand, PATENTLY-O (May 6, 2015), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/05/nautilus-in-
definiteness-remand.html [https://perma.cc/J44A-YDTJ].
109. Biosig, 783 F.3d at 1379.
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is the core of much of the common law,”110 perhaps making this at least a
standard that lower courts are more comfortable applying when com-
pared to the insolubly ambiguous standard.111 This seems to be plausible
as the Federal Circuit reported that “[i]n the wake of [Nautilus], judges
have had no problem operating under the reasonable certainty
standard.”112
And yes, right after the opinion and for a year or so, the Federal Cir-
cuit and lower courts directly cited and sometimes discussed the new rea-
sonable certainty standard.113 In fact, it seemed at first that the Federal
Circuit did believe that Nautilus changed the law of indefiniteness, for it
stated that “[t]his was indeed the very purpose of the Nautilus
decision.”114
Moreover, the Federal Circuit found phrases to be indefinite in two
separate instances: “molecular weight” in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.115 and “unobtrusive manner that does not distract the
user” in Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.116 Yet even in these opin-
ions, the Federal Circuit looked to its own pre-Nautilus precedent in mul-
tiple instances.117 And in the case of Interval Licensing LLC., the Federal
Circuit ultimately conducted its analysis, which led to the indefinite find-
ing, under Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc.118 As Jason
Rantanen has pointed out, Datamize was “the very case to which the
original standard of ‘insolubly ambiguous’ is often attributed.”119
110. Id. The Federal Circuit followed this statement by identifying several areas of com-
mon law in which a standard of reasonableness is used, including the reasonable person
foreseeability standard in tort law. Id. (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99
(1928) and comparing it with Jay v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 998 F.2d
979, 984 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (an opinion “discussing whether a reasonable person could con-
clude a certain vaccine caused the child’s death”)).
111. This may be another touch of sarcasm; however, it is because the first of two cases
cited is the infamous Palsgraf opinion, the crux of much frustration and uncertainty in first-
year tort law classes.
112. Biosig, 783 F.3d at 1381.
113. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (quoting the new reasonable certainty standard from Nautilus at the beginning of its
indefiniteness analysis); DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1260
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (same); Freeny v. Apple Inc., No. 2:13–CV–00361–WCB, 2014 WL
4294505, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2014) (quoting Nautilus but also explaining the new
“standard does not render all of the prior Federal Circuit and district court cases
inapplicable”).
114. Dow Chem. Co. v. Nova Chems. Corp., 803 F.3d 620, 630, 631 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(holding that its “original decision [applying the insolubly ambiguous standard] would have
been different under the new Nautilus standard.”).
115. 789 F.3d at 1344–45 (concluding after looking at the claim language, specification,
and prosecution history, that a PHOSITA “would still not be reasonably certain in light of
the entire record as to which type of average [weight] was intended”).
116. 766 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
117. See Rantanen, supra note 70, at 440 (explaining that even as the “Federal Circuit
described the contours of the Nautilus” opinion in Interval Licensing, it nevertheless
“harkened back to its own precedent”).
118. 417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
119. See Rantanen, supra note 70, at 440.
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Fast forward just a year or so from Nautilus, and certainly when you
look at the most recent Federal Circuit opinions, and this movement back
to pre-Nautilus reasoning (and the absence of even the recitation of Nau-
tilus language) is even more apparent.120 When Nautilus is cited, it is not
always done so with accuracy or precision. For example, in HZNP
Medicines LLC v. Actavis Laboratories UT, Inc.,121 a 2019 opinion, the
Federal Circuit explained that the “Nautilus definiteness standard re-
quires that the basic and novel properties be known and definite.”122
Then, instead of going further into the reasonable certainty standard, or
even parroting the language of Nautilus, the Federal Circuit cited to one
of its own opinions from 2015, explaining that “‘[a] claim is indefinite if
its language might mean several different things and no informed and
confident choice is available among the contending definitions.’”123 The
HZNP opinion then simply state that it “appl[ied] the Nautilus definite-
ness standard to the basic and novel properties of the formulation
patents.”124
Ultimately, and just as Rantanen concludes in his article on Teva and
Nautilus, “[t]he Federal Circuit continues to routinely reject indefinite-
ness challenges . . . [while] its formal doctrinal analyses look virtually
identical to those before the Supreme Court intervened.”125 Moreover,
he explains,
In applying the Nautilus standard, the Federal Circuit is still treating
claims as reasonably certain as long as the person construing the
claim can arrive at a reasonable construction. And, although the Fed-
eral Circuit has not come out and said it (nor is it likely to), the only
claims for which one cannot arrive at a reasonable construction are
those that are not amenable to construction or are insolubly
ambiguous.126
Unlike the Federal Circuit, which has already moved away from strictly
applying Nautilus in a somewhat uniform manner—in a direction that is
not noticeably different from the previous insolubly ambiguous standard
in application—the district courts are more chaotic. Some district courts
are sticking close to the language of Nautilus and doing their best to work
through the new standard,127 while many others are still directly citing to
120. See id. at 440–41 (“The court’s other post-Nautilus decisions follow the same pat-
tern: a boilerplate recitation of Nautilus followed by actual analysis under its own
precedent.”).
121. 940 F.3d 680 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
122. Id. at 696.
123. Id. at 698 (quoting Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d
1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). This language appeared shortly after Nautilus in Interval Li-
censing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding claims are indefinite
when they “might mean several different things and no informed and confident choice is
available among the contending definitions”).
124. HZNP, 940 F.3d at 688.
125. Rantanen, supra note 70, at 430.
126. Id. at 447.
127. See, e.g., Velocity Patent LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Nos. 13-cv-8413, 13-
cv-8419, 13-cv-8418, 2016 WL 5234110, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2016) (finding the term
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and applying the insolubly ambiguous128 and amenable to construction129
standards.
Other district courts are seemingly processing aloud the extent of the
change the reasonable certainty test brings to the law of indefiniteness.
The District of Massachusetts is one district court that has voiced its
doubts that the Nautilus standard is much different than the “insolubly
ambiguous” standard, stating that “the relevant inquiry stays the
same.”130 And the Central District of California finds itself confused,
stating that “[i]t is unclear how much of the Federal Circuit’s indefinite-
ness jurisprudence survives Nautilus.”131 The California district court
continued processing the old and the new standards by finding that “Nau-
tilus suggests that the problem with the Federal Circuit’s test was simply
that the words ‘not amenable to construction’ and ‘insolubly ambiguous’
were ‘more amorphous than the statutory definiteness requirement al-
lows.’”132 In this way, if it were the particular words, not the impact of
those words, “Nautilus may have amounted to little more than an admo-
nition not to use the words ‘not amenable to construction’ and ‘insolubly
ambiguous.’”133
This chaotic march through various options after studying the Nautilus
opinion and Federal Circuit precedent will continue to play out and result
in a fractured approach across the United States. Until more concrete
“insufficient engine speed” not indefinite and explaining that “some modicum of uncer-
tainty . . . is the ‘price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation’”). Other
district courts are looking not only to the Nautilus standard but also to guidance in older
Federal Circuit opinions as Nautilus did “not render all of the prior Federal Circuit and
district court cases inapplicable.” Freeny v. Apple Inc., No. 2:13–CV–00361–WCB, 2014
WL 4294505, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2014). For example, in Sensor Electronic Technol-
ogy, Inc. v. Bolb, Inc., No. 18-CV-05194-LHK, 2019 WL 4645338, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24,
2019), the Northern District of California cited to much of the Nautilus language but then
used a 2014 Federal Circuit opinion to guide it through its analysis. See also AptusTech
LLC v. Trimfoot Co., No. 4:19-CV-133, 2020 WL 772456, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2020)
(heavily citing Nautilus language in its discussion of the indefiniteness standard); Uniloc
2017 LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2:18-CV-00492-JRG-RSP, 2020 WL 569858, at *3 (E.D. Tex.
Feb. 5, 2020) (same); Kaneka Corp. v. Zhejiang Med. Co., No. CV 11–02389 SJO (SHSx),
2018 WL 2718036, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2018) (same).
128. See, e.g., Am. River Nutrition, LLC v. Beijing Gingko Grp. Biological Tech. Co.,
419 F. Supp. 3d 1226, 1239 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (citing the reasonable certainty standard from
Nautilus but then immediately following that with citation and application of the “insolubly
ambiguous” language and Federal Circuit precedent); RMH Tech LLC v. PMC Indus., Inc.,
No. 3:18-cv-00543 (VAB), 2018 WL 3733954, at *16 (D. Conn. Aug. 6, 2018) (“A court will
find a claim indefinite ‘only where a person of ordinary skill in the art could not determine
the bounds of the claim, i.e., the claims are insolubly ambiguous.’”); Not Dead Yet Mfg.
Inc. v. Pride Sols., LLC, 265 F. Supp. 3d 811, 832 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“The court agrees that its
prior ruling is at odds with Defendants’ assertion of indefiniteness. ‘[O]nly claims not ame-
nable to construction or insolubly ambiguous are indefinite.’”).
129. See, e.g., Crane Sec. Techs., Inc. v. Rolling Optics AB, 166 F. Supp. 3d 76, 90–92
(D. Mass. 2016) (citing to Nautilus language at the front half of the opinion but ultimately
holding that the term “optical effect” was definite because it was “amenable to
construction”).
130. Boston Sci. Corp. v. Cook Inc., 187 F. Supp. 3d 249, 271 (D. Mass. 2016).
131. Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. Romeo & Juliette, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-028120-
ODE(CWx), 2016 WL 7017219, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2016).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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guidance is provided, the district courts must do the best they can with
very few meaningful words that, indeed, are imprecise themselves.
B. PRE-ISSUANCE PATENT CLAIMS & POST-ISSUANCE PATENTS IN
AIA PROCEEDINGS
After Nautilus, some patent commentators thought there may be just
one standard of indefiniteness applied, regardless of whether the claims
were under examination at the USPTO, in post-issuance patent litigation,
or in post-grant procedures. One such example is Lisa Larrimore Ouel-
lette and Jonathan Masur, who co-authored a short article after the re-
lease of the Nautilus opinion, explaining that “it seems that Miyazaki’s
articulation of the legal standard for indefiniteness is no longer good law
(unless, of course, the Federal Circuit adopts this as the unitary test).”134
Just two days after the Nautilus opinion was decided, the PTAB issued
its own opinion regarding the applicable indefiniteness standard in pre-
issuance patents in Ex parte Breed.135 While the PTAB quoted Nautilus in
Ex parte Breed, the PTAB relied on the indefiniteness standard in
Miyazaki. The PTAB explained: “a claim is properly rejected as indefi-
nite if it is ‘amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions.’”136
Accordingly, the PTAB sustained the examiner’s rejection of Claim 1 be-
cause the phrase “can be” was “susceptible to more than one plausible
construction.”137 Overall, from this 2014 board opinion, it is clear the
USPTO wanted to continue employing the strict standard of indefinite-
ness in pre-issuance patents instead of adopting the reasonable certainty
standard articulated by the Supreme Court.
Just prior to the issuance of this PTAB opinion, but after certiorari had
been granted in Nautilus, the Federal Circuit made its own determination
regarding whether there should be a unitary standard in pre-issuance ver-
sus post-issuance patents.138 In In re Packard, the Federal Circuit deter-
mined that the indefiniteness standard the USPTO employed should
apply to claims under examination (pre-issuance claims).139 While the
patent applicant wanted the Federal Circuit’s insolubly ambiguous stan-
dard applied instead of the MPEP standard that the examiner in fact ap-
plied—which states that “[a] claim is indefinite when it contains words or
phrases whose meaning is unclear”140—the Federal Circuit held the
134. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Jonathan Masur, How will Nautilus Affect Indefinite-
ness at the PTO?, PATENTLY-O (June 5, 2014), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/nauti-
lus-affect-indefiniteness.html [https://perma.cc/R6Q6-7JGJ].
135. No. 2012-003990, 2014 WL 2536964 (P.T.A.B. June 4, 2014).
136. Id.
137. Id. at *3 (finding Claim 1 indefinite under the Miyazaki standard).
138. See In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curium).
139. Id. at 1312.
140. See MPEP, supra note 58, § 2173.05(e); see also In re Packard, 751 F.3d at 1309
(explaining the patent applicant “insists that the Board misapplied the standard of indefi-
niteness by finding his claims indefinite on grounds that they ‘contain[ ] words or phrases
whose meaning is unclear’” instead of applying the “‘insolubly ambiguous’ standard to his
claims”).
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following:
[W]hen the USPTO has initially issued a well-grounded rejection
that identifies ways in which language in a claim is ambiguous, vague,
incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining
the claimed invention, and thereafter the applicant fails to provide a
satisfactory response, the USPTO can properly reject the claim as
failing to meet the statutory requirements of § 112(b).141
The Federal Circuit further explained that the Supreme Court in Nauti-
lus was considering the post-issuance standard for indefiniteness, but pre-
issuance claim rejections by the USPTO “arise in a different posture.”142
The concurrence further explained that the PTAB was justified in apply-
ing a “lower threshold for ambiguity,”143 meaning it may apply a test that
makes it easier to trigger the indefiniteness standard. Indeed, at this junc-
ture, the patent applicant is able to amend claims and, for that reason and
for public notice in general, the USPTO needs to be most concerned with
clarity in pending claims.144
The question after In re Packard was whether this stricter standard for
pre-issuance patent claims would stand the test of time after Nautilus,
withstanding the pressure to have one unitary standard. In answering this
question, the PTAB issued another precedential decision, and as with
Miyazaki, it is rare to have a precedential decision come down from a
board (now the PTAB instead of the BPAI).
Ex parte McAward confirmed that during pre-issuance examination,
the PTAB will continue to use “the approach for assessing indefiniteness
approved by the Federal Circuit”145 in In re Packard. The standard now
tacks the MPEP language onto the vagueness language from In re Pack-
ard: “A claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose
meaning is unclear,”146 and “claims are required to be cast in clear—as
opposed to ambiguous, vague, indefinite—terms.”147 This low thresh-
old—low as in it does not take much to trigger an indefiniteness rejection
from an examiner—is important, the PTAB found, because § 112 re-
quires “that claims be written in clear and unambiguous terms.”148 These
terms “‘necessarily invoke[ ] some standard of reasonable precision in the
141. In re Packard, 751 F.3d at 1311.
142. Id. at 1312.
143. Id. at 1323 (Plager, J., concurring).
144. See id. at 1315, 1323; see also MPEP § 2173.02(1) (“The Office does not interpret
claims when examining patent applicants in the same manner as the courts.”).
145. Ex Parte McAward, No. 2015-00646, 2017 WL 3669566, at *5 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 25,
2017) (precedential). This PTAB opinion, like other board decisions and Federal Circuit
opinions, still fails to “bring us any closer to addressing the perceived explanation of what
is considered ‘reasonable’ regarding ‘broadest reasonable interpretation,’ ‘reasonable de-
gree of certainty and particularity,’ ‘reasonable certainty’ and ‘reasonable precision.’”
David M. Longo, Ex parte McAward—Testing Claims for Indefiniteness, PATENTLY-O
(Oct. 24, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/10/mcaward-testing-indefiniteness.html
[https://perma.cc/8N5U-L78W].
146. MPEP, supra note 58, § 2173.05(e) (citing In re Packard, 751 F.3d at 1314).
147. In re Packard, 751 F.3d at 1313.
148. Ex parte McAward, 2017 WL 3669566, at *6.
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use of language in the context of the circumstances.’”149
When applying this standard to the claim language at issue—which
stated that the water detector was “configured to be reliably installed by
an untrained installer or a homeowner and to not require the services of a
plumber or electrician to perform installation, thereby permitting wide-
spread and cost effective adoption”—the PTAB concluded this claim lan-
guage was “unusual.”150 Why? Because the claim did not define the
structure or function of the water detector. Instead, the claim “at-
tempt[ed] to further define the water detector’s structure by the skill level
required to install the water detector.”151 When analyzing the meaning of
this claim language, the PTAB determined that the “language fail[ed] to
provide adequate clarity to the required structure because the skill level
of ‘an untrained installer or a homeowner’ is ambiguous and vague, and
thus, the meaning of a structure configured to be ‘reliably installed’ by
such an installer is unclear.”152
When making this determination, the PTAB echoed previous reasons
why this stricter standard of definiteness is justified in the pre-issuance
context.153 Mainly, the applicant here had the opportunity to take the
examiner’s feedback and amend the claims, unlike with post-issuance
claims.154
That said, the PTAB was careful to steer clear of holding that this
stricter standard applies or should apply to post-issuance America In-
vents Act (AIA) proceedings.155 Post-issuance AIA proceedings include
post-grant review (PGR), inter partes review (IPR), and covered business
method review (CBM). In the U.S., grounds for challenging a post-grant
patent at the PTAB include subject-matter eligibility, novelty, nonobvi-
ousness, and the written description.156 The written description of a pat-
ent is where invalidity rests, falling under § 112(b), so in post-grant
proceedings the question of which standard to use for indefiniteness ap-
plies. As noted above, board opinions commonly apply the stricter
Miyazaki/Packard standard,157 yet at this point, there is no precedential




153. Id. at *4 (“The lower threshold makes good sense during patent examination be-
cause the patent record is in development and not fixed, the Office construes claims
broadly during that period, and an applicant may freely amend claims.”).
154. It is interesting to note here that the applicant had added the at-issue recitation
(along with others) in an amendment that was added in an attempt to overcome two sepa-
rate anticipation rejections and one obviousness rejection. The original language included
the requirement that the “plumber” be a “licensed professional plumber” and that the
“electrician” be a “licensed electrician.” In response to these additions, the examiner re-
jected the limitation as unclear and indefinite because the language failed to provide any
structure to the apparatus or system that would enable it to be “configured” to function as
described in the claims. See id. at *2.
155. Id. at *5 n.4 (“We do not address, in this decision, the approach to indefiniteness
that the Office follows in post-grant trial proceedings under the America Invents Act.”).
156. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012).
157. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
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PTAB decision extending the reasoning of Ex parte McAward to post-
issuance proceedings. Accordingly, uncertainty remains with respect to
the relevance and application of Nautilus in the context of post-issuance
proceedings.
Even more uncertainty exists right now within IPR proceedings. In IPR
proceedings, available grounds are limited to anticipation and obvi-
ousness.158 Yet claim construction is a prerequisite to deciding the issues
of anticipation and obviousness. And with indefiniteness intertwined with
determining the scope of a patent in claim construction, it is unclear what
a board should do when faced with an indefinite term in IPR. Board
opinions have determined that a claim is indefinite, and yet they have
declined to cancel it as such. In one such case, the post-Nautilus Board
used the amenable to construction standard, and stated that when “claims
are not amenable to construction, [the Board is] unable to conclude that
there is a reasonable likelihood that [the] Petitioner would prevail” in
challenging such claims.159 This is consistent with the stricter pre-issuance
standard that the PTAB uses when assessing whether claims in the first
instance are definite or not.
In February 2020, the Federal Circuit sought to provide guidance on
what the PTAB is supposed to do when it finds that a claim is indefinite—
Should it refuse to cancel the patent or cancel it despite not really having
the authority to do so? In Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Prisua
Engineering Corp., the Federal Circuit held that in IPR proceedings, the
PTAB should no longer invalidate patent claims as indefinite.160 One im-
mediate concern of practitioners is that the PTAB, in response, “may
start denying more petitions if they want to avoid issues of indefinite-
ness.”161 Of course, one way to decrease the level of uncertainty in IPRs
is to permit the PTAB to invalidate patents as indefinite, just like the
PTAB can with post-grant review.162
In conclusion, the level of uncertainty is high when we look at the re-
sulting taxonomy of the indefiniteness doctrine: pre-issuance patents and
158. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
159. Facebook, Inc. v. TLI Commc’ns LLC, No. IPR2014-00556, 2014 WL 4644360, at
*8 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 15, 2014).
160. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Prisua Eng’g Corp., 948 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (“We reject Samsung’s contention that the IPR statute authorizes the Board to can-
cel challenged claims for indefiniteness. In Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee[, 136 S. Ct.
2131, 2141–42 (2016)], the Supreme Court said the Patent Office would be acting ‘outside
its statutory limits’ by ‘canceling a patent claim for “indefiniteness under § 112” in inter
partes review.’”).
161. Daniel C. Tucker, 5 Takeaways from the Ban on IPR Indefiniteness Rulings,
LAW360 (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.finnegan.com/en/firm/news/5-takeaways-from-the-
ban-on-ipr-indefiniteness-rulings.html [https://perma.cc/22DN-UBGS].
162. See id. (“One way to address the issue would be for Congress to change the statute
to allow the PTAB to invalidate patents as indefinite in IPRs, much like they can for post-
grant reviews (PGRs) and covered business method reviews (CBMs). [The author] said,
‘It’s not expanding their task at hand because the PTAB is already determining whether
the claims are indefinite as part of the prior art invalidity analysis. It’s expanding their
jurisdiction, but it’s not expanding what they’re already determining. It’s just giving them
the authority to act on that determination.’”).
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post-issuance AIA proceedings apply a strict standard where only one
interpretation of the claim is permitted; post-issuance patents in federal
litigation either have an amenable to construction, insolubly ambiguous,
or reasonable certainty standard applied, with the difference between the
three standards quite unclear.
VI. LOOKING TO CONTRACT LAW TO RETHINK PATENT
LAW’S INDEFINITENESS STANDARD
This Article argues that there is another body of law that may provide
guidance to the patent community: contract law. Indeed, likely many at-
torneys and law students upon hearing the words “indefiniteness” or
“ambiguity,” may not first think of the patent doctrine of claim indefi-
niteness discussed above. Rather, they may think back to their respective
first-year contracts course and the case involving the interpretation of the
word “chicken,”163 or the case about a promise to give “a fair share of
profits.”164 This Part will revisit those first-year contract law cases, ones
involving promises that are either too vague or too indefinite to enforce
or ones involving words that must go through an interpretative analysis
due to some type of ambiguity.
The comparison and contrast of the standards in patent law with the
standards used in contract law for indefinite contracts and contracts in-
volving ambiguous language can help guide patent law’s rethinking of its
own indefiniteness standard for all forms of patent adjudication. Impor-
tant to note here, however, is that while this Article argues that this com-
parison and contrast is a valuable one, this Article does not argue that
this is a perfect analogy, nor does it argue that patent law should align
itself with contract law. Rather, it is the similarities and differences be-
tween the two bodies of law that are the most theoretically rich in helping
to rethink how patent law should decide what level of claim definiteness
and resulting certainty is needed at various stages of patent claim assess-
ment: pre-issuance, post-issuance in federal courts, and post-issuance
AIA proceedings in front of the PTAB.
A. INDEFINITE CONTRACTS
Just like precision of language is important to patent claims, precision
of language is important in contract law. Because “[a]ll contracts are in-
complete,”165 the optimal level of certainty needed in contract law de-
pends, at least in part, on the aims of contract law. For purposes of this
Article, this Section starts with the premise that a central aim of contract
163. See Frigaliment Imp. Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
164. See Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 823 (N.Y. 1916). Another case that comes to
mind is Sutlif v. Seidenburg, 64 P. 131, 131 (Cal. 1901) (per curium), where the promise at
issue was to assist “to make a success” of a business.
165. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1641 (2003).
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law is to respect the autonomy of the contracting parties—that is, to en-
force the bargain that was struck between the two parties.166
In modern practice, and despite the fact that contracts are incomplete,
there are very few instances where a contract is unenforceable. An indefi-
nite contract is one of those instances. As Robert Scott has explained:
“One of the core principles of the common law of contracts is that the
promises of parties to a legally enforceable contract must be certain and
definite such that their intention may be ascertained with a reasonable
degree of certainty.”167 Just like in patent law, however, there is an under-
standing that “[a]ll agreements have some degree of indefiniteness and
some degree of uncertainty.”168 The question is, How much indefinite-
ness—how much uncertainty—is too much, such that the contract should
be declared unenforceable? Answering this question is the focus of this
Section.
Judge Cardozo gave us his answer in a 1921 opinion, when he explained
that “[i]ndefiniteness must reach the point where construction becomes
futile.”169 Judge Cardozo was, in other words, communicating that if the
court has something to work with, or, really, anything to work with, an
agreement will not fail for lack of definiteness.170 As Judge Cardozo
demonstrated, the determination of whether a contract fails for indefi-
niteness is a question of law.171
Even more so now than in 1921, modern contract law embraces the
“futile” standard where a court just needs something to work with in or-
der to avoid finding a contract indefinite and unenforceable. The Restate-
ment (Second) states that the terms of a contract must simply “provide a
basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appro-
166. This is an oversimplification, but one that is sufficient for purposes of this Article.
Still, it is important to recognize that it is a general statement that not all contract scholars
would agree with. For example, some scholars would narrow the statement, finding that
“contract law aims to enforce, and should be designed to facilitate, primarily commercial
promises.” Erik Encarnacion, Contract as Commodified Promise, 71 VAND. L. REV. 61, 66
(2018) (challenging this “widely held” view of contract law). Other scholars would argue
that, at least “[f]rom the economic perspective, the aim of contract law is to maximize
social utility rather than to give effect to private will.” Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy
of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1801 (1997); see
also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 27–28 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that
“the common law is best (not perfectly) explained as a system for maximizing the wealth of
society”).
167. Scott, supra note 165, at 1647 (emphasis added).
168. 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 95, at 396 (1963).
169. Heyman Cohen & Sons v. M. Lurie Woolen Co., 133 N.E. 370, 371 (N.Y. 1921)
(emphasis added).
170. See id. At least for the agreement at issue in this case, all Judge Cardozo said they
needed was some way to fix a quantity term: “We think the implication plain that the buyer
is to fix the quantity, subject only to the proviso that quantity shall be limited by ability to
supply.” Id.
171. White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So. 2d 1042, 1052 (Ala. 2008) (find-
ing that “whether a writing fails for indefiniteness is properly a question of law”); see also
Richter, S.A. Invs. U.S.A. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 939 F.2d 1176, 1196
(5th Cir. 1991) (“[W]hether a contract fails [for indefiniteness] is a question of law.”).
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priate remedy.”172 Similarly, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Arti-
cle 2 explains: “Even though one or more terms are left open a contract
for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to
make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an ap-
propriate remedy.”173
UCC Article 2 goes even further to avoid having a sale of goods agree-
ment fail for lack of definiteness by permitting parties to leave out any
term in their agreement except for the quantity term.174 This includes
leaving open the price and payment terms, place of delivery, shipping
terms, risk of loss, warranties, and so on.175 Of course, the more terms
that are left open, the more unlikely it is that a court will be able to find a
reasonable construction and appropriate remedy.
Overall then, and similar to Judge Cardozo’s futile standard of contract
indefiniteness, if a court can “reach a fair and just result” by filling in gaps
or inferring a term based on commercial practice or some other usage of
custom, it will do so in order to avoid frustrating the parties’ intentions.176
If a court cannot make any sort of construction, then the contract fails for
indefiniteness and the analysis stops there.177
As a result of this easy-to-meet standard of any reasonable construc-
tion, it is relatively rare that a contract will fail for indefiniteness. This
standard fits the aims of contract law in two ways. First, contractual
agreements generally only involve two parties. Second, once it is deter-
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (emphasis
added).
173. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
174. See, e.g., id. § 2-201, cmt. 1 (explaining that “[t]he only term which must appear is
the quantity term which need not be accurately stated but recovery is limited to the
amount stated”). Section 204 of the Restatement (Second) contains a parallel provision:
“When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with
respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term that
is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 204.
175. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305 (titled “Open Price Term” and setting forth a process to
fill in an open price term); id. § 2-308 (“Absence of Specific Place of Delivery”); id. § 2-309
(“Absence of Specific Time Provisions; Notice of Termination”); id. § 2-310 (“Open Time
for Payment or Running of Credit”).
176. 1 CORBIN, supra note 168, § 95 at 400 (“If the parties have concluded a transaction
in which it appears that they intend to make a contract, the court should not frustrate their
intention if it is possible to reach a fair and just result, even though this requires a choice
among conflicting meanings and the filling of some gaps that the parties have left.”); see
also FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 180 (3d ed. 1986)
(“Upon being satisfied that an agreement was intended or that one party justifiably relied
on the deal and the other party ought to have known that he would so rely, the courts have
been ready to supply missing terms and to give concrete meaning to indefinite terms, pro-
vided (it is often said), that objective criteria for establishing terms are available in the
agreement itself, or that such terms can be inferred from a prior or subsequent course of
dealing, or accepted business practices. To be sure, the mere fact that the parties thought
they had a contract is not enough to turn an agreement utterly lacking in definiteness into a
contract, but before courts are ready to strike down a bargain, ‘indefiniteness must reach
the point where construction becomes futile.’” (quoting Heyman Cohen & Sons, Inc. v. M.
Lurie Woolen Co., 133 N.E. 370, 371 (1921))).
177. Vohs v. Donovan, 777 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (“If an essential term
is indefinite, thereby rendering the contract unenforceable, the analysis ends there.”).
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mined that the parties intended to create an enforceable contract, the
analysis continues with multiple checkpoints along the way, such as the
statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule, to help ensure the parties’
intentions are respected.
This means that going through the process to fill in the gaps of an in-
complete contract is not only feasible but also only directly impacts the
two parties named in the contract.178 There is no “public” to worry about
in bilateral agreements. So if a court gets the construction wrong, or if the
construction unfairly favors one party, while it may not be ideal or what
the parties intended before entering the agreement in the first place, the
impact is not far-reaching. And at best, an unfavorable construction will
serve to teach the parties to contract better the next time around. This
latter policy will be further discussed in the next section when discussing
ambiguities in contracts.
When thinking further about why this standard works in contracts—
that if any construction can be made, the contract is enforceable—the
main concern of enforcing an incomplete agreement is whether there was
really an agreement between the parties. When studying cases of indefi-
nite contracts, oftentimes courts find agreements are simply not construa-
ble when there is a serious question of whether there was an agreement in
the first instance.
Take for example, an early case out of New York. In Mackintosh v.
Thompson, the plaintiff argued that when he told his employer he in-
tended to quit unless he was paid more, the employer promised to give
him a share of profits from a current project.179 When the plaintiff pushed
to get the employer to name a particular amount or percentage he was
told, “You can rely on me. I will see that it is all right.”180 When deter-
mining whether there was a definite and certain agreement here, the
court had nothing to work with, ultimately finding that the supposed
agreement was too indefinite to form an obligation on the part of the
employer.181 With this telling of the story, already most favorable to the
plaintiff, it is questionable whether there was any promise made at all by
the employer, let alone one that was clearly and definitely stated to
render it an enforceable agreement.
The other type of indefinite contract that consistently appears is in cir-
cumstances where there is not really a question that there is an agree-
ment, but the language is so vague that it is impossible to make any sort
of interpretation from the language. Another early New York case, Var-
ney v. Ditmars, showing this type of indefinite contract had the following
language that the New York Court of Appeals ultimately declined to con-
178. Occasionally there are third parties that will benefit from a contract, yet that third
party must be named and the benefit the third party received must be clear. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302.
179. Mackintosh v. Thompson, 68 N.Y.S. 492, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1901).
180. Id. at 494.
181. See id.
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strue (and thus enforce): “[A] fair share of . . . profits.”182 In this case, the
plaintiff draftsman argued that was the language his architect used to mo-
tivate him to give more effort on important, upcoming projects.183 Sim-
ply, the word “fair” is too vague. Or, at least, the language is too vague in
light of zero helpful evidence surrounding the agreement such as past
performances where the parties said “fair” and ended up giving a particu-
lar amount to the plaintiff.
In both of these opinions, the court found, in essence, that it was use-
less or futile to construe the language. There was simply not enough to
work with, and to construe something here with the language of “[y]ou
can rely on me[,] I will see that it is all right”184 or “a fair share of . . .
profits”185 risks enforcing a promise that was never made or intended as a
promise. Again, if we take seriously that the aim of contract law is to give
effect to the intentions of parties, then this is the right standard to apply
when determining whether a contract is definite.
Yet, what happens when a term is not completely left open or left out
of the agreement, but rather is either unclear on its face, or through some
sort of external event, it is revealed that the term had a different meaning
to each respective party? That is when the doctrine of ambiguity comes
into play. The next section explores how contract law handles different
types of ambiguity that appear intrinsically or extrinsically to an
agreement.
B. AMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS
A problem for both patent law and contract law is that, at least in part,
words do not just have one precise meaning. As Holmes said: “It is not
true that in practice (and I know no reason why theory should disagree
with the facts) a given word or even a greater collocation of words has
one meaning and no other. A word generally has several meanings, even
in a dictionary.”186 Moreover, like in patent law where the Supreme
Court has warned: “Some persons seem to suppose that a claim in a pat-
ent is like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direc-
tion, by merely referring to the specification, so as to make it include
something more than, or something different from, what its words ex-
press,”187 so, too, contract law encounters the problem of word manipula-
tion (whether intentional or not).
Despite this problem of the imprecision of language, or, likely better
stated, in light of it, courts most often state that the “plain meaning” of
182. Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 823 (N.Y. 1916).
183. See id. 823–24.
184. Mackintosh, 68 N.Y.S. at 494.
185. Varney, 111 N.E. at 823.
186. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV.
417, 417 (1899).
187. White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1886).
2020] Distinctly Claiming an Invention 571
the language of a contract should govern.188 The benefit of applying the
plain meaning rule is to limit the amount of extrinsic evidence admitted
when determining the intent of the parties, as well as to encourage parties
to not view terms within a contract like a nose of wax.189 As Samuel Wil-
liston and Richard Lord have written: “[W]hen the terms of a writing are
plain and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation or construc-
tion since the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove doubt
and uncertainty.”190
Accordingly, extrinsic evidence, such as previous discussions or drafts
of the agreement between the parties, is only admissible if the court con-
cludes that the contract is definite but also ambiguous.191 As with indefi-
niteness in contracts, the question of whether a contract is ambiguous is a
question of law.192
The standard for finding that a contract as a whole, or certain portions
or provisions, is ambiguous is straightforward: when a contract or con-
tract provision “is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations” it is am-
biguous.193 And starting from the opposite approach—unambiguity—
Williston explains the standard for finding that a contract is
unambiguous:
When the court can determine the meaning of a written contract
without any guide other than knowledge of the simple facts on
which, from the nature of language in general, its meaning depends,
the terms of the contract will be deemed unambiguous. To be unam-
biguous, a contract must be reasonably capable of only one construc-
tion; in other words, a contract is unambiguous if it can be given a
definite or certain meaning as a matter of law.194
This construction is done from the viewpoint of someone that is “rea-
sonably intelligent” and is familiar with the industry in which the agree-
ment is set, so that if there are any terms of art or unique customs, this
will be taken into account when determining whether there is an ambigu-
ity or not.195
188. See CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES & MATERI-
ALS 413 (9th ed. 2019) (“Courts often state that the ‘plain meaning’ of the language of a
contract should govern and that extrinsic evidence is admissible only if the court concludes
that the contract is ambiguous.”).
189. But see 3 CORBIN, supra note 168, § 538 at 66–69 (arguing that courts should con-
sider all evidence, both objective and subjective, in order to determine the intention of the
parties at the time the agreement was entered).
190. 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 30:4 (4th ed. 1993).
191. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 3.10, at 136–37 (7th ed. 2014).
192. Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 419 (3d Cir. 2013)
(“Whether a contract is ambiguous is an issue of law subject to plenary review.”).
193. Sköld v. Galderma Labs. L.P., 917 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Duquesne
Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 614 (3d Cir. 1995)).
194. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 190, § 30:4 (emphasis added).
195. See id.; see also Rastall v. CSX Transp., Inc., 697 A.2d 46, 50 (D.C. 1997) (“In this
context, a reasonable person is: (1) presumed to know all the circumstances surrounding
the contract’s making and (2) bound by usages of the terms which either party knows or
has reason to know.”).
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But beyond just labeling something ambiguous or not, most commonly,
courts (and scholars) separate ambiguity into one of two types: patent (or
intrinsic) ambiguity and latent (or extrinsic) ambiguity. Within those two
types of ambiguity, there are subtypes.196
A patent ambiguity is one that exists on the face of the contract, such
as a term that is defined differently in various sections of the agreement
or a term that is inappropriately used given the context of the agree-
ment.197 This type of ambiguity is within the four corners of the agree-
ment, meaning it is intrinsic to the agreement. A specific type of patent
ambiguity is the open-ended ambiguity, which occurs at times when open
standards such as “best efforts” and “industry standards” are used.198
In contrast to a patent ambiguity, a latent ambiguity does not appear
on the face of the agreement. Instead, a latent ambiguity only “arises
from extraneous or collateral facts which make the meaning of a written
[agreement] uncertain.”199 The classic latent ambiguity is an instance of
indefiniteness of expression when the contract refers to a place, person,
or thing, yet extrinsic evidence shows that there are two or more of that
named place, person, or thing. This type of ambiguity should not be con-
fused with the doctrine of contract indefiniteness, which was just dis-
cussed above. Here, contract law is simply using the word
“indefiniteness” to refer to the lack of precision of language.
For example, when parties used the description “hay house” in an in-
surance policy, it seemed clear and unambiguous on its face, yet later it
was discovered that there were two separate “hay houses.”200 Proving
that this type of ambiguity exists often means that evidence that is
outside—extrinsic to—the agreement must be introduced.201
A more modern example is a Federal Circuit opinion involving a patent
settlement.202 After a patent suit had been settled and a consent decree
entered that permitted the defendant to manufacture and sell a product
containing electrolytes, glucose, and psyllium as long as, among other re-
quirements, the amount of electrolytes and glucose was equal to or
greater than 69.5% by weight, a latent ambiguity arose as to the meaning
196. See WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 190, § 30:4 (describing different types of ambi-
guities that arise in agreements).
197. See Ambiguity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (“A patent ambigu-
ity is that which appears on the face of the instrument, and arises from the defective, ob-
scure, or insensible language used.”).
198. See Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997,
998–99 (1992) (describing “open terms” as “contractual provisions that expressly grant a
party substantial, but not completely unfettered, discretion in performance”).
199. Easton v. Wash. Cty. Ins., 137 A.2d 332, 336 (Pa. 1957).
200. See Lycoming Mut. Ins. v. Sailer, 67 Pa. 108, 112 (Pa. 1870); see also Koplin v.
Franklin Fire Ins. of Phila., 44 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945) (showing a latent ambi-
guity arose in an insurance policy where plaintiff had two chicken houses and it was un-
clear which chicken house was No. 1 and which was No. 2).
201. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 614 (3d Cir.
1995) (explaining that “extrinsic evidence may be utilized to demonstrate the existence of a
latent ambiguity”); see also Sköld v. Galderma Labs. L.P., 917 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 2019)
(“Ambiguity arises when language . . . has a double meaning.”).
202. See Gjerlov v. Schuyler Labs., Inc., 131 F.3d 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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of the term “glucose.”203 This ambiguity became apparent only after the
patentees commissioned a laboratory test of the defendant’s new formu-
lation.204 The patentees’ test interpreted the term “glucose” to mean glu-
cose anhydrous, while the defendant’s test interpreted the term “glucose”
to mean glucose monohydrate.205 This is a classic indefiniteness of ex-
pression case, when the contract employs a critical term that is not suffi-
ciently defined.
Another example of this type of patent ambiguity is the infamous
“chicken case,” Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales
Corp.,206 which most law students study in their first-year contracts
course. Remember, these ambiguities only come to the surface after ex-
trinsic evidence is introduced showing that the term could be interpreted
by the parties, and later construed by the court, in more than one reason-
able way.
Another type of latent ambiguity occurs when a contract uses a term
that has a double meaning. For example, a court found the use of the
symbol “$” or of the term “dollars” in a contract providing for compensa-
tion of workers was ambiguous because some of the workers were based
in Canada and others were based in the United States.207 There, the court
held it was not clear whether the “$” symbol or the term “dollars” was in
reference to Canadian dollars or American dollars.208
Whether there is a patent or latent ambiguity, the court will move on in
the next step of interpretative analysis. As the Frigalement case demon-
strated, as well as the glucose opinion above, the next steps of analysis
most often include the introduction of parol evidence, as well as multiple
expert opinions.209 The goal of this extrinsic evidence is to determine
which construction, out of the two or more reasonable constructions of
the at-issue term or provision, is the one that the parties intended.210
While this significantly increases transaction costs, the parties had every
opportunity to avoid this ambiguity when forming the contract. Further,
the parties can also decide ex ante how to handle this type of ambiguity in
the contract, as well as which party pays for any necessary litigation or
arbitration.211
There is also a doctrine of contract law that may come into play when
203. Id. at 1018–20.
204. Id. at 1018.
205. Id.
206. 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). I am not the first patent scholar to make this
connection with this particular case or in this context. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at
1758 & n.60 (citing Frigaliment and explaining that they “have observed elsewhere that
patent infringement analysis requires the interpreter to map textual claims onto objects or
processes in the real world”). This naturally also occurs in some other areas of law, such as
determining whether a contractual provision is satisfied by the goods delivered.
207. Rastall v. CSX Transp., Inc., 697 A.2d 46, 51 (D.C. 1997).
208. Id.
209. See supra, notes 202–206 and accompanying text.
210. See 3 CORBIN, supra note 168, § 538.
211. See generally John F. Coyle & W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Interpreting Contracts
Without Context, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1673, 1684 (2018) (noting that parties can decide ex
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an ambiguity arises in an agreement: contra proferentem.212 Contra
proferentem is a well-established doctrine of contract law that is best de-
scribed by the Restatement of Contracts: “Where words or other mani-
festations of intention bear more than one reasonable meaning an
interpretation is preferred which operates more strongly against the party
from whom they proceed, unless their use by him is prescribed by law.”213
In other words, under this doctrine, ambiguities in terms should be con-
strued against the drafting party. The justification of this rule is simple:
the drafter is the party that had the chance to avoid ambiguous language
in the first instance, and, moreover, is also the party that has the chance
to avoid ambiguous language in the next contract.214 The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts explains in a comment that the drafting party is
“more likely than the other party to have reason to know of uncertainties
of meaning” and may “leave meaning deliberately obscure.”215
Overall, the standard for determining when a contract or contract pro-
vision is ambiguous is stricter than the standard for determining when a
contract is indefinite. To avoid classification as an indefinite contract, the
court must ensure that the construction of the agreement is not futile—
that there is a construction possible that will result in a fair or just out-
come for the parties. To avoid classification as an ambiguous contract,
thereby opening the door to extrinsic evidence, the court must ensure not
only that there is a construction but also that there is only one reasonable
construction of the at-issue language within the agreement. If there are
two reasonable constructions that can be made, then the contract is
deemed ambiguous. Again, note that the outcome of these determina-
tions is dramatically different: indefinite contracts are ruled void and un-
enforceable, and ambiguous contracts are likely still enforceable, yet the
extent to which they are enforceable depends on further interpretative
analysis.
ante whether or not to arbitrate agreements, and the implications arising from such
decisions).
212. Latin meaning “against the offeror.” Contra proferentem, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY (11th ed. 2019). This doctrine still exists in modern law, although it most often arises
in the case of insurance. There, the “ambiguity doctrine” is the well-known and entrenched
rule that when there is an ambiguity in a policy or contract of insurance, the ambiguity is
ordinarily to be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.
See David S. Miller, Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the Ambi-
guity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1850 (1988); John P. Arness & Randall D.
Eliason, Insurance Coverage for ‘Property Damage’ in Asbestos and Other Toxic Tort
Cases, 72 VA. L. REV. 943, 948–50 (1986) (describing the ambiguity doctrine as an “estab-
lished principle of insurance law”).
213. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 236(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
214. See Richard Frankel, The Arbitration Clause as Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L.
REV. 531, 555–56 (2014).
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see
also Frankel, supra note 214, at 555–56 (explaining that this rule helps to prevent “drafting
parties [from] hav[ing] the perverse incentive to write purposefully ambiguous contracts
that they can [then] exploit to their benefit and to the detriment of the non-drafting
party”).
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C. MOVING TOWARDS GREATER CERTAINTY IN PATENT LAW
Before getting into the specifics of how comparing patent claim defi-
niteness and ambiguity in the contract law context is helpful, there is a
similarity between patent law and contract law that should not be over-
looked here. As Dan Burk and Mark Lemley highlighted in their article
on claim construction, “Lawyers are paid to interpret language—whether
in statutes, contracts, or patent claims—in ways that serve their clients’
interests. And they are, as a general matter, quite good at it.”216 Moreo-
ver, beyond being paid, attorneys are charged with zealously advocating
for their clients.217 Whether it is this charge by itself, the money, an inter-
nal drive to find the best outcome within the law for their client, or some
combination thereof, the law should expect lawyers to argue for an inter-
pretation of an issued patent that reflects what their respective client
wants the claim to say (or language to mean in a contract). Because of
this, the question should not simply be: What standard of indefiniteness
should the USPTO and federal courts apply? But, rather, what standard
of indefiniteness is best in those respective forums in light of the aims of
patent law?218
When answering this question, one simple answer is that the standard
of indefiniteness in patent law should be the same as it is in contract law.
In other words, that patent law and contract law should handle patents
and contracts that are not certain or definite in the same way. In terms of
enforcement, or lack of enforcement, this Article agrees with the result
but not the answer to the posed question. Yes, contract law should not
enforce a contract that is indefinite, and, in turn, patent law should not
grant a patent in the first instance, or should invalidate (thereby declaring
the patent unenforceable), any patent that is indefinite. However, as to
the standard to determine whether a patent or contract is definite or in-
216. Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1750; see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9,
at 57 (explaining that “patent applicants [through patent attorneys] game the system by
drafting ambiguous patent claims that can be read narrowly during examination, such that
they avoid a novelty rejection, and broadly during litigation, which supports a finding of
infringement”); Fromer, supra note 15, at 552 (finding “patentees rationally have little to
no incentive to offer more information than the patent laws require and have an incentive
to obfuscate information they provide whenever possible”); Rajec, supra note 8, at 1902–03
(explaining in the patent context that “third parties theoretically have notice of what is
protected” yet the meaning of claim terms, and the differences of potential meanings, “may
result from ambiguity introduced by a patent applicant [through a patent attorney], either
unintentionally, or with the intent to cover future and unpredictable variations on her
invention”).
217. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A law-
yer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with
zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”).
218. Asking a similar question, but in the context of contract law, Schwartz and Scott
were not interested in asking the “conventional normative question: What contract law
should the state provide?” Schwartz & Scott, supra note 48, at 618. Instead, they wanted to
ask: “What contract law do business firms want the state to provide?” Id. Their answer:
firms would prefer a strict formalist approach—”firms want the state to enforce the con-
tracts that they write, not the contracts that a decisionmaker with a concern for fairness
would prefer them to have written.” Id.
576 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
definite, patent law and contract law should not utilize the same standard.
The reason: third parties.
Enforceable agreements generally involve two parties: buyer and
seller, mortgagee and mortgagor, creditor and debtor, and so on. When
agreements have an effect on a party not in the contract—a third party—
modern contract law separates these third parties into two categories: in-
tended beneficiaries and incidental beneficiaries.219
An intended beneficiary is the only type of third party that has any
rights or duties under an agreement that it is not a party to. Generally, to
be designated as an intended beneficiary, there has to be some express
language in the agreement demonstrating that the contracting parties in-
tended to benefit a particular third party or group of third parties.220
This is a significant departure from patent law, where almost any justi-
fication given for patent law’s grant of exclusive rights is tied directly to
the effect on third parties. Although the use of the terminology, “third
parties,” is not as common in patent law as it is in contract law, the con-
cept of downstream effects on third parties is not new to patent law.221
Indeed, the commonly touted utilitarian goal of patent law is that the
patent system should be designed and act in such a way as “to promote
the development, disclosure, and use of new technologies, ideally in a
way that maximizes social welfare.”222
The involvement, or downstream effects, on third parties has a signifi-
cant influence on the level of certainty and precision in the law. This is
demonstrated by the difference between two fields of commercial law:
the informality of the UCC Article 2 (Sale of Goods) compared to that
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. a (“This Section distinguishes
an ‘intended’ beneficiary, who acquires a right by virtue of a promise, from an ‘incidental’
beneficiary, who does not.”).
220. See id. § 302(1); see also Vogan v. Hayes Appraisal Assocs., Inc., 588 N.W.2d 420,
424 (Iowa, 1999) (explaining that the contract-at-issue “‘[was] so expressed as to give [the
third party] reason to know that such benefit is contemplated by the [party to the contract]
as one of the motivating causes of his making the contract’” (citing Tredrea v. Anethesia &
Analgesia, P.C., 584 N.W.2d 276, 281–92 (Iowa, 1998))).
221. The impact of patent rights on particular third parties, as opposed to the general
public or the specific PHOSITA, is undertheorized compared to fields of law such as con-
tract law, tort law, and criminal law. That said, there are scholars who are routinely explor-
ing and analyzing third-party rights in intellectual property law. Sarah Rajec is one of those
scholars, arguing, for example, that “when third-party property interests are strongest,
courts are most likely to deviate from the maximalist version of a private property rights
understanding of patents.” Rajec, supra note 8, at 1862; see also Sarah R. Wasserman
Rajec, Patents Absent Adversaries, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1073, 1073 (2016) (identifying the
scope of a patent impacts parties beyond those directly represented in any given dispute
and arguing that “adjudicating patents absent adversaries . . . is both inefficient and inef-
fective to construe patent claims without the guiding context of a controversy”).
222. John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 509 (2010);
see also Karen E. Sandrik, Formal but Forgiving: A New Approach to Patent Assignments,
66 RUTGERS L. REV. 299, 343 (2014) (“It is generally accepted that patent law rests on a
utilitarian foundation whereby Congress has the power to create patent laws to ‘promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries”).
2020] Distinctly Claiming an Invention 577
of the rigid, bright-line rules articulated in Article 9 (Secured
Transactions).223
Because of the drastically different aims of contract law and patent law,
the comparison and contrast between the indefiniteness doctrine in con-
tract law and patent law is one that must be made with caution and inten-
tional thought. This is what this Article intends to do here.
Furthermore, as this Section will show, what one field of law is doing is
not likely a good fit for the other; however, when determining whether a
patent is definite, federal courts are using, at least at times, a standard
that is significantly similar to the standard state courts use when deter-
mining whether a contract is definite. This is problematic. The overlap in
indefiniteness standards also demonstrates in a different way why the Su-
preme Court wanted to step into the area of patent indefiniteness after
not having done so for decades. It also demonstrates why John Love, a
former Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy at the
USPTO, called for a stricter standard of claim definiteness in pre-issu-
ance patents.
Recall that in contract law, a court will only deem a contract unen-
forceable for indefiniteness when there is no possible construction of an
enforceable term—when an effort to construe the enforceable term is
“futile.” How does the standard of indefiniteness in contract law compare
to the various standards in patent law? In short, the futile standard for
definite contracts is strikingly similar to the amenable to construction or
insolubly ambiguous standard in patent law.
As patent scholars had noted about the insolubly ambiguous standard
prior to the Nautilus opinion, it was not a “significant hurdle for paten-
tees” for “some time.”224 The Federal Circuit even selected the same
word as Judge Cardozo—futile—explaining a finding of patent indefinite-
ness was only appropriate “‘if reasonable efforts at claim construction
prove futile.’”225 And finally, Judge Plager of the Federal Circuit stated
prior to Nautilus that “the general conclusion from our law seems to be
this: if a person of ordinary skill in the art can come up with a plausible
meaning for a disputed claim term in a patent, that term, and therefore
the claim, is not indefinite.”226 It is like the Federal Circuit was stating
that so long as there is any construction that can be made, the claim will
not fail for indefiniteness.227 This is the standard for finding a contract
223. See Sandrik, supra note 222, at 340–43 (explaining that the difference in formality
and bright-line rules in Article 2 versus Article 9 rests with the involvement of third parties
in the latter and very little third-party involvement in the former).
224. CRAIG NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 154 (3d ed. 2014); see also discussion supra
Part III.
225. Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(emphasis added) (quoting Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
226. Enzo Biochem, Inc, v. Applera Corp., 605 F.3d 1347, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Plager,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis added).
227. This word, “any,” is used in the Datamize opinion. See supra Part III for a full
discussion.
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indefinite, one that is at times exceedingly hard to fail with the flexible
and informal system of UCC Article 2 and modern contract law. And the
Federal Circuit is now, just six years later, already substantially moving
back to this standard, even after the Nautilus opinion.
But when viewing that easy-to-meet standard in patent law through the
lens of contract law, it is most evident that the insolubly ambiguous stan-
dard is not strict enough for the aims of patent law. How is that standard
going to motivate patent drafters to claim precisely so that third parties
can rely on the claims to inform them of where the boundaries of the
invention are? It is not. Moreover, how is that standard going to lead to
more certainty ex ante of litigation for third parties to rely on when mak-
ing decisions regarding research and product development? It is not. The
standard for patent law indefiniteness must be stricter to accomplish the
aims of patent law.
Yet, contrast the standard of indefiniteness in contract law with the
stricter standard of finding a contract ambiguous. Recall that to be unam-
biguous, “a contract must be reasonably capable of only one construc-
tion.”228 This standard is strikingly similar to the Miyazaki standard
employed in patent law to pre-issuance patent claims. There, the Board
explained that “if a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim
constructions” then the patent examiner is justified in rejecting the claims
based on indefiniteness.229 Of course, when two reasonable constructions
are possible, the result is different in contract law than in patent law. In
contract law, the contract is held ambiguous and the interpretation analy-
sis moves forward. In patent law, the indefinite patent claims at the pre-
issuance stage are rejected and the patent applicant has a chance to
amend the claims or to explain to the examiner why the examiner is
wrong. At the post-issuance stage, the patent is declared invalid (and
therefore unenforceable).
Another detail to compare and contrast of patent law’s doctrine of in-
definiteness and how contract law handles ambiguities in contract law, is
from who’s perspective the respective standards construe the at-issue lan-
guage. In patent law, the construction is from the perspective of the
skilled artisan, the PHOSITA, and in contract law, it is from the perspec-
tive of the “reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context
of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of customs, prac-
tices, usages, and terminology as generally understood in the particular
trade or business.”230 Although the standard is more informally stated in
contract law, this reasonably intelligent person is somewhat similar to the
PHOSITA, as the person has experience in the particular industry.
For example, if the contract at issue involves two pharmaceutical com-
panies disputing whether one party used the required “reasonable ef-
228. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 190, § 30:4 (emphasis added).
229. Ex parte Miyazaki, No. 2007-3300, 2008 WL 5105055, at *5 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 19,
2008) (precedential); see also discussion supra Part III.
230. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 190, § 30:4.
2020] Distinctly Claiming an Invention 579
forts” towards “identifying one or more library compounds with ‘activity
in the Field,’” contract law informs that the construction of the term “rea-
sonable efforts” is from the perspective of one knowledgeable of these
types of joint research agreements in the relevant pharmaceutical indus-
try.231 The import of that experience is that the person should know and
understand how language is and is not used in that particular industry.
Yet contract law takes the standard for finding a contract unambiguous
a step further than patent law. The court is guided in its interpretive anal-
ysis of a contract by the classification of the ambiguity: Is it a patent or
latent ambiguity? If latent, what type of latent ambiguity? This helps the
court and parties understand what extrinsic evidence may be relevant. It
also helps parties who are discussing settlement determine how a finding
of ambiguity might impact the costs of continuing forward in litigation.
As a result, contract law has been able to create consistent precedent
and better certainty in an area that is mired in uncertainty. This is not to
say that the ambiguity analysis in contract law is an easy one, but the
analysis is predictable (even if the result is not). This makes sense, for
“[e]nforcement of written agreements presupposes a theory of interpreta-
tion.”232 Generally, courts cite and stick to the plain meaning rule.
Moreover, and perhaps most important to the potential future of more
definite claims, due to the recognition that there are different types of
ambiguity, courts (and hopefully the litigating parties) often reflect on
how the at-issue ambiguity may have been avoided. Patent law can learn
from contract law’s more nuanced approach, which has an eye towards a
theory of interpretation and understands that with indefiniteness, at least,
a contract will only not be enforced if there is no information for a court
to work with. Contract law scholars have certainly criticized this ap-
proach, as it does not motivate drafters of contracts to draft their agree-
ments more completely. Likewise, that same criticism can be leveled at
the current state of patent law’s indefiniteness doctrine. As the law
quickly erodes back to its pre-2014 state, at least in federal litigation, pat-
ent holders know their patents are unlikely to be invalidated on indefi-
niteness grounds so long as there is at least one plausible meaning to the
terms within their claims.
Finally, one item that is missing from patent law but is found in con-
tract law on this subject is empirical research. Some patent scholars, such
as John Allison and Lisa Ouellette, have started this much needed work
in their empirical study looking at how § 112 functions in practice, with
§ 112 covering not only claim definiteness but also the disclosure require-
231. I use this “prototypical” example from contract scholars who created and used this
example to illustrate their concept of how parties use “braided contracts” to manage un-
certainty. See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interac-
tion of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1377, 1377, 1405 (2010) (creating a prototypical example of a pharmaceutical collabo-
ration and licensing agreement to illustrate that parties respond to uncertainties by inter-
twining or braiding formal and informal terms together).
232. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 48, at 618.
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ments of enablement and written description.233 What their study re-
vealed, inter alia, is that there was a statistically significant difference that,
for example, “electrical patents were less likely to be invalidated than
those in other technology fields on written description and were bested
only by mechanical patents on enablement.”234 Moreover, “[p]atents in
the pharmaceutical industry that were tested in litigation not triggered by
a generic drug maker’s filing of an ANDA . . . fared poorly on both writ-
ten-description and definiteness grounds.”235
This is important work, but it is just one step towards better under-
standing how different types of patents fair in § 112 challenges. Classifica-
tion of the type of claim ambiguities would be helpful for courts to start
creating consistent precedent and would allow further empirical study by
patent scholars. Like contract law scholars such as Schwartz and Scott
have done (in their argument that firms want a stricter formal approach
to interpretation), with further empirical data and research, patent law
scholars could help determine what approach best furthers the goals of
patent law. I seek to do at least some of that work in a future project.
VII. CONCLUSION
While contract law and patent law are fields that are more different
than alike, this Article demonstrates that changing the lens through which
one views the doctrine of patent law indefiniteness can bring a fresh per-
spective that leads to better understanding of the various standards used
within the doctrine. Here, comparing and contrasting the indefiniteness
doctrines in patent law and contract law, as well as exploring how con-
tract law handles ambiguity more generally, has shown how much indefi-
niteness is too much indefiniteness given the unique policy aims of patent
law.
This Article has argued that the insolubly ambiguous standard, which is
still routinely applied by district courts and the Federal Circuit despite its
overruling in Nautilus, is not a strict enough standard in light of patent
law’s aims. In essence, this is the standard in contract law’s indefiniteness
doctrine, a field that generally only directly impacts two parties. With the
foundation of the patent system resting on a properly functioning system
that discloses information to third parties, the insolubly ambiguous stan-
dard does not promote sufficient certainty in the drafting and interpreta-
tion of patent claims.
Furthermore, this Article has shown that one standard currently in
place at the USPTO could work with the addition of more nuanced cate-
gories, like how contract law handles ambiguities in contract language.
This standard is the USPTO’s stricter Miyazaki standard, where claims
should only be amenable to one construction. With only one reasonable
233. John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent Defi-
niteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 609 (2016).
234. Id. at 613.
235. Id. at 614.
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construction of terms within patent claims, patent applicants will be more
likely to claim the actual metes and bounds of their respective invention
with more precision. This, in turn, may lead to more effective disclosure
and notice to third parties interested in learning from or designing around
the patented invention or technology.
582 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
